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MOVING PUBLIC LAW OUT OF THE DEFERENCE
TRAP IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES
Jim Rossi*

This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a
"deference trap" in addressing conflicts in deregulated
industries,such as telecommunications and electric power. The
deference trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in
disputes involving political institutions, such as regulatory
agencies and state governments. By reassessing the deference
trap across the legal doctrines that are affecting emerging
telecommunicationsand electric power markets, public law can
deliver much more for deregulatedmarkets. The deference trap
imposes a particularcost as markets are deregulated, one that
may not have been present during previous regulatory eras in
which public and private interests in regulatory bargaining
were more likely to converge. In expanding the range and
degree of potential divergence between public and private
interests, deregulation challenges policymakers and courts to
reevaluate many of the traditionalpublic law doctrines that
frame the process for defining and implementing the rules in
competitive markets. This Article sets out to advance this
project in the context of three vignettes. In so doing, I draw on
a bargaining account of regulation, supplemented with a
comparative institutionalanalysis. The approachevaluates the
institutional setting for governance of deregulated markets; it
does not limit its analysis to the decisions of a single regulator
but pays attention to alternative (and often competing)
institutions, including courts, Congress and state legislatures,
and state and federal regulators.

Part II illustrates that public law has fallen into a deference
trap in the context of the filed tariff doctrine and suggests that,
by focusing on bargaining conditions in tariffing, courts could
minimize strategic forum shopping in regulatory enforcement.
* Harry M. Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research,
Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Greg Goelzhauser for his
able research assistance in preparation of a draft.
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PartIII warns against public law falling into a deference trap
in the context of judicial review of state regulation under the
dormant commerce clause and state action immunity to
antitrust enforcement and suggests that courts correct for this
by taking into account private firm incentives in the state
lawmaking process. PartIV suggests that federal preemption,
as currently construed, also invites a deference trap which can
create regulatory commons problems and recommends that
courts reformulate preemption principles to realign the
incentive to facilitate regulatory coordination between the
federal government and states. By isolating ex ante and ex post
incentives and stressing the institutional context for
institutional bargaining in the regulatory process, together
these examples reveal weaknesses in traditional doctrines of
regulatory law in deregulated markets and suggest ways courts
might correct for them.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Theories of economic regulation modulate between optimismassociated with those who view regulators as benignly pursuing the
public interest or other civic-minded goals'-and pessimism-most
commonly associated with the public choice school, which sees
regulators as captured by the powerful private firms they are
charged to regulate.2 These accounts of regulation focus mainly on
regulation's substance rather than on the process by which it is
enacted and its ability to promote stability in government policy for
the operation of markets and the decisions of investors. Yet,
whatever account is best in the abstract, regulatory law has failed
utterly to examine the evolution of regulation and how it interacts
with changes in technology, economic conditions, and political
preferences.3 Such a focus will have important implications for how
we understand the role of courts, and especially public law, in
deregulated industries.'

1. See Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 7 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992).

2. For a summary of public choice perspectives on public law, see
A.

FARBER &

PHILIP

P.

FRICKEY,

LAW

AND

PUBLIC

(1991); JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAOS
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw (1997).
INTRODUCTION

CHOICE:

DANIEL
A CRITICAL

& GOVERNANCE:

USING

3. George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation"Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1993).
4. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
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Placing focus on "deregulatory takings" (constitutional and
breach of contract challenges to deregulation policies), as many did
in the 1990s, appropriately centers on the bargaining aspects of the
regulatory process.5 However, advocates of deregulatory takings
envision courts as enforcers of rights and contractual bargains. This
account of the judicial role has many critics, 6 but the strongest
argument against deregulatory takings is that it envisions activist
judicial review of the interactions between government and firms.7
If courts are to award compensation for deregulatory policies, their
primary role is to search for and sustain preexisting bargains
between firms and the government-a role that does not fit with the
longstanding tradition of judicial deference to regulatory bodies.
The fate of deference given deregulation is a much debated
topic. More than two decades ago, a classic exchange between (now
judge) Merrick Garland and Cass Sunstein debated the merits of
courts engaging in "hard look" review of agency decisions to
deregulate industries." In the context of electric power deregulation,
Richard Pierce has advocated judicial deference in certain contexts. 9
Judicial deference has an undeniably important place in public law
generally, including in the law of economic regulation. Deference
recognizes the costs of judicial review of complex and technical
regulatory matters whose resolution courts are ill-equipped to reach

Regulated Industries Law, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1369 (1998) ("Although

lacking the same policymaking authority as Congress and regulatory
commissions, the courts affect the pace, extent, or manner of regulatory change
each time they decide a case involving legislative or administrative regulatory
policies-whether they ratify, overturn, or require the government to reconsider
a particular policy.").
5. The leading treatment is J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing

that deregulation without compensation for "stranded costs" constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property).
6. See generally Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 1535 (1999); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident
Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999); Jim Rossi, The Irony of
Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REv. 297 (1998) (reviewing SIDAK & SPULBER,
supra note 5).
7. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 6; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim
Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REv. 1435 (2000).
8. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and JudicialReview, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 505 (1985) (criticizing "hard look" review of agency decision making); Cass
Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177
(advocating for the "hard look").
9. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of
Agency Rules: How FederalCourts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991).
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on their own. In fact, for most of the twentieth century, courts
played a modest role in regulated industries. Courts engaged in
judicial review of regulatory agency decisions, but, by and large,
agency decisions were not upset by the judiciary, which routinely
deferred to the expertise and political accountability of regulators.
Regulators were largely seen as facilitating a convergence between
private and public interests, particularly where they regulated only
a handful of firms on an ongoing basis. This convergence was
certainly not perfect-a lot of regulation was counterproductive, as
public choice theorists remind us-but it was stable for more than a
few generations. Especially given the stability of this regulatory
order, the deference approach was inviting to courts, as it allowed
judges to avoid meddling in complex and highly technical matters
which courts frequently lacked sufficient expertise and competence
to resolve.
As attractive as deference may be, it also presents a pernicious
trap for federal courts. By embracing deference too broadly courts
create a strong presumption of no judicial intervention. However,
where regulatory conditions change, this presumption may no longer
be appropriate and can easily eviscerate important doctrines of
public law for deregulated industries, leaving the judicial branch a
mere bystander in many disputes about emerging market policies.
This Article argues that public law has fallen into what I call a
"deference trap" in addressing conflicts in deregulated industries
and other regulated industries in transition, such as the
telecommunications and electric power industries. The deference
trap describes a judicial reluctance to intervene in disputes
involving political institutions, such as federal regulatory and state
governmental agencies. By reassessing the deference trap across
the legal doctrines that are affecting emerging telecommunications
and electric power markets, public law has the capacity to deliver
much more for deregulated markets.
The deference trap poses a particular cost as markets are
deregulated, one that may not have been present during previous
regulatory eras in which public and private interests in regulatory
bargaining were more likely to converge. Just as the traditional
regulatory process may have responded disproportionately to the
strongest interest groups, the process by which deregulatory policies
are formulated and implemented may invite policy makers to
respond disproportionately to new interest groups, possibly leading
to the enactment of economic policies that thwart, rather than
enhance, the overall welfare effects of competition.1 ° For instance,
10. In this vein, this Article looks skeptically on the use of the term
"deregulation'-a misnomer given that regulation of many "deregulated"
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given the dual jurisdictional system for regulating electric power in
the United States, firms have strategic ways to escape the
jurisdiction of state or federal regulators, taking advantage of gaps
or jurisdictional overlaps in regulatory enforcement. In contrast,
cost-of-service regulation provided ways of coordinating these gaps
between regulatory authorities and evaluated firm-specific conduct
more carefully-backing this up with enforcement in the setting of
the firm's rates-thus minimizing (but certainly not eliminating) the
divergence between private and public interests.
In expanding the range and degree of potential divergence
between public and private interests, deregulation challenges policy
makers and courts to reevaluate many of the traditional public law
doctrines that frame the process for defining and implementing the
rules in competitive markets. This Article sets out to advance this
project in the context of three vignettes. In doing so, I draw on a
bargaining account of regulation, supplemented with a comparative
institutional analysis. The approach evaluates the institutional
setting for governance of deregulated markets; it does not limit its
analysis to the decisions of a single regulator but pays attention to
alternative (and often competing) institutions, including courts,
Congress and state legislatures, and state and federal regulators.
One caveat is in order at the outset: The approach of this Article is
not to embrace activist judicial review of preexisting bargains (as do
advocates of deregulatory takings), but to focus more on the
bargaining conditions that surround the lawmaking process. By
focusing on the bargaining conditions under which regulation is
formulated and enforced, I shall argue that public law has the
capacity to improve the functioning of competitive markets, such as

industries continues on in a new form. The use of "deregulation" in this Article
is not intended to imply complete dismantling of regulation, but discarding
certain features of traditional regulation, such as cost-of-service ratemaking.
Frequently, partial regulation of industries such as electric power and
telecommunications remains long after these industries are deregulated.
Deregulation generally entails disentangling the network characteristics of
these industries from their competitive sectors, and regulation of networks by
federal, state, and local governments remains active, even in the most
"deregulated" environments. As Alfred Kahn has stated, "The decision to
regulate never represents a clean break with competition." II ALFRED E. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 113 (1988). So too, the decision to embrace
competition in these industries never represents a clean break with regulation.
See PAUL L. JosKow & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 211-12 (1983) ("Our analysis
leads us to conclude that any sensible deregulation scheme will require
continuing economic regulation of some segments of the electric power
industry.");

LEAN-JACQUES

LAFFONT

&

JEAN

TIROLE,

COMPETITION

IN

272 (2000) (discussing the regulatory approaches for
deregulated telecommunications markets).
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
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those evolving in telecommunications and electric power.11
Part II illustrates that public law has fallen into a deference
trap in the context of the filed rate doctrine and suggests that, by
focusing on bargaining conditions in tariffing, courts could minimize
strategic forum shopping in regulatory enforcement. Part III warns
against public law falling into a deference trap in the context of
judicial review of state regulation under the dormant commerce
clause and state action immunity to antitrust enforcement,
suggesting that courts correct for this by taking into account private
firm incentives in the state lawmaking process. Part IV suggests
that federal preemption, as currently construed, also invites a
deference trap which can create regulatory commons problems and
recommends that courts reformulate preemption principles to
realign incentives to facilitate regulatory coordination between the
federal government and states. By isolating ex ante incentives and
stressing the institutional context for the adoption and enforcement
of regulation, together these examples reveal weaknesses in
traditional doctrines of regulatory law in deregulated markets and
suggest ways courts might correct for them.
II.

USING PUBLIC LAW TO MITIGATE STRATEGIC FORUM SHOPPING
IN REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

The filed rate doctrine is a venerable doctrine of public utility
regulation. When a court applies it-and courts frequently do-the
doctrine serves as a litigation shield for regulated utilities. Federal
courts invoking this shield frequently defer to regulators and refuse
to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged antitrust violation or tort or
contract claim whose resolution would require a departure from a
utility's filed rate.12 Like many venerable legal rules, the filed rate
doctrine is rarely questioned. For over a century, it has served
many important purposes. However, with deregulation of wholesale
electric power markets at the federal level and various degrees of
deregulation across the states, both the doctrine's continued
applicability and usefulness are increasingly suspect.
Moreover, as recent examples in the industry suggest,
presumptive application of the filed rate doctrine by both firms and

11. For further elaboration of this approach, see JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY
(2005). In this book, I address more fully how a
bargaining account of regulatory systems can sustain a vision of public law for
deregulated industries that strikes a balance between deference and judicial
intervention.
12. For extensive discussion of the doctrine, see Jim Rossi, Lowering the
Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L.
REV. 1591, 1598-1601 (2003).
BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAw
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courts can cause affirmative harm for the development of energy
markets and policy. For example, a recent U.S. District Court
decision in Texas applied the filed rate doctrine in an astonishingly
broad manner, precluding antitrust claims against energy suppliers
in the deregulated Texas wholesale power market and leaving those
harmed by market abuses without any legal or administrative
remedy. 13 Examples such as this illustrate a serious need for
reassessment of the doctrine by federal courts in the energy context.
Both courts and litigators have at their disposal ways of lowering
the filed tariff shield to allow more efficient energy markets to
develop, furthering better the goals of energy policy.
A.

History and Context

Historically, federal courts developed the filed rate doctrine to
further the purpose of natural monopoly regulation-protecting
consumers against discrimination in utility service rates. A utility
with a filed tariff is prohibited from offering customers rebates and
discounts that are at odds with the filed tariff, which historically
reflected a regulator's careful evaluation and affirmative approval of
costs and prices. In addition to the noneconomic goal of fairness, the
nondiscrimination principle behind the filed rate doctrine also has
an economic purpose.
The general idea behind a regulator
prohibiting price discrimination is to preclude a monopolist from
using its market power to extend its monopoly into secondary
For most of the twentieth century, cost-of-service
markets."
regulation provided regulators a ready forum for ensuring that rates
did not discriminate in ways that caused serious losses to social
welfare. While nondiscrimination in rates is the primary purpose
courts give for applying the filed rate doctrine, two other goals of the
doctrine play an important role for historically regulated industries,
such as electric power.
First, where a federal court is asked to apply substantive state
law, as often occurs in a fraud or breach of contract claim, there is a
federal preemption strand to the filed rate doctrine. For example,
the Ninth Circuit invoked the filed rate doctrine to bar California's
governor from commandeering expensive wholesale power contracts
during the state's recent deregulation crisis. 15 The court's rationale
for invoking the doctrine in that case was that the state's action
would present a conflict with a tariff filed with the Federal Energy
13. Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., No. C-03-249, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13908, at *46-47 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2004).
14. For discussion, see Rossi, supra note 12, at 1598-1601.
15. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1056-59
(9th Cir. 2001).
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Regulatory Commission (FERC). While the court relied on the filed
rate doctrine, at the bottom line it was making a legal determination
that federal preemption precluded state regulatory action.
Second, and especially relevant to judicial consideration of
federal antitrust claims, there is an agency deference strand to the
doctrine. Courts find the filed rate doctrine particularly inviting
where a matter is highly complex and technical, as many energy
disputes are. The leading case on this is Keogh v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co.,'8 decided by the Supreme Court in 1922.

Keogh held that a private antitrust plaintiff is precluded from
recovering treble damages against a carrier based on the claim that
a tariff filed with the interstate commerce commission was allegedly
monopolistic. Noting that section 8 of the Interstate Commerce Act
gave shippers injured by illegal rates actual damages plus attorney's
fees, Justice Brandeis reasoned that the rate issue is one best
determined by the agency, not by a court. 17
While federal courts have almost presumptively applied the
filed rate doctrine to matters that have undergone a rate hearing,
there are two recognized exceptions to the doctrine. First, courts
generally do not apply it where the injured party is a competitor,
rather than a consumer, as in this context a judicial remedy would
not necessitate a departure from the filed rate. 8 Second, courts
have been very reluctant to apply it to antitrust claims raising
colorable price squeeze concerns, as in this context regulators lack
jurisdiction to remedy allegedly illegal conduct. ' 9
B.
The Implications of the Filed Rate Doctrine in Deregulated
Markets
In the deregulated electric power industry, the filed rate
doctrine continues to play an important role in precluding judicial
enforcement of antitrust, contract, and tort laws. For instance, the
filed rate doctrine has been used to bar antitrust claims in the
deregulated electric power industry. In Town of Norwood v. New

16. 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
17. Id. at 162-64.
18. See, e.g., Cost Mgmt. Servs. v. Wash. Natural Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 94548 (9th Cir. 1996); Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
1985).
19. See, e.g., City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1177-80
(8th Cir. 1982); City of Mishawaka v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314,
1321-24 (7th Cir. 1977); see also John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price
Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563, 638-39 (1984)
(explaining that price squeeze claims pose a special challenge to the extent a
utility is able to manipulate the dual jurisdictional framework).
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England Power Co., 20 the First Circuit invoked the Keogh strand of

the filed rate doctrine to bar a price squeeze claim against a utilityeven where the tariff filed with FERC was a market-based tariff
relying on competitively set prices. 2' The Norwood court reasoned,
"[i]t is the filing of the tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or
scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate doctrine."22
However, the deference trap of automatic application of the filed
rate doctrine to the partially deregulated electric power industry
leads to harmful results.23 The conventionally understood concern
with the application of the filed rate doctrine in deregulated
markets is that, by valuing regulatory over market price
determinations, it stands in the way of competitive markets.
Markets depend on price fluctuations, and, if taken to its extreme,
the filed rate doctrine can freeze market prices in ways that impede
rather than facilitate coordination of supply and demand.
Another concern with the filed rate doctrine arises due to the
strategic actions of firms in the regulatory process. To the extent
that cases such as Norwood allow the mere filing of tariffs to
presumptively determine whether a court will exercise jurisdiction,
the filed rate doctrine invites even more radical deregulation than
either Congress or the regulatory agencies accepting tariffs would
prefer-that is, markets absent antitrust and common law remedies.
As the Ninth Circuit has observed, Congress did not intend this
result in enacting either the Federal Power Act or subsequent
energy legislation.24
Unlike other types of immunity from litigation, which often
apply to firms across the board, the filed rate doctrine is a firmspecific defense. To the extent the filed rate doctrine is used by
courts as a basis to decline jurisdiction, private firms might look to
ex ante tariffing as a clever strategy to foreclose antitrust or
common law litigation, thus reducing the possibility of ex post
judicial enforcement. Allowing private conduct to determine the
institutional forum for market enforcement leads to a serious bias
against judicial enforcement. This bias in favor of regulatory
agencies privileges private choice over public assessment of the
effectiveness of dual enforcement.
Reliance on private forum selection for a regulatory
20. 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000).
21. Id. at 418-21. The Keogh strand of the filed rate doctrine has its
genesis in Keogh v.Chicago & Northwest Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). See
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
22. Town of Norwood, 202 F.3d at 419.
23. Rossi, supra note 12, at 1615-29.
24. California ex rel. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 383 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir.
2004).
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enforcement mechanism poses a particularly costly problem as we
move from cost-of-service based regulation to a different approach to
regulating markets, focusing on inputs or the structure of access to
important facilities for competition. For instance, a utility lacking
market power can file an umbrella tariff with FERC; this, coupled
with quarterly reports (including numerical details on actual sales
prices), will satisfy the Federal Power Act's requirement that FERC
find wholesale rates to be "just and reasonable."25 FERC has a
much-debated market power test,26 but market based tariffs do not
include a filed rate-only an offer to negotiate, which can have the
odd effect of preventing enforcement of antitrust, tort, and contract
laws. Similarly, transmission tariffs can raise filed rate issues, as
firms may use these tariffs to maintain that the conduct of
individual transmission-owning utilities, regional transmission
organizations, or independent service operators are immune from
antitrust enforcement and other legal protections against market
misconduct.2 7
While courts do not have the same degree of expertise that
agencies possess, courts do have some comparative institutional
competence in implementing enforcement regimes that could benefit
competitive markets. Unlike regulatory agencies, courts do not
depend on budget allocations or legislative delegations of specific
regulatory jurisdiction. Courts have wider remedial authority and
discovery powers than do regulatory agencies as well as greater
political independence. Thus, as we implement competition policy
for electric power markets, judicial enforcement of remedies for
market abuses based on violations of antitrust, tort, and contract
law can play an important role in protecting public welfare. To the
extent the filed rate doctrine privileges private choice over
assessment of the public interest in choosing the mechanism for
enforcement, courts should refuse to apply it automatically to
preclude judicial enforcement.
C.

A Texas-Sized Regulatory Enforcement Gap

In June 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, Corpus Christi Division, applied the filed rate doctrine to
preclude antitrust claims for illegal conduct in deregulated
wholesale power markets against numerous power supply

25. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2000).
26. See Duke Power, 109 F.E.R.C. 61,270, at 62,265 (2004) (describing
and applying FERC's market power test).
27. For example, a federal bankruptcy court rejected PG&E's filed rate
defense based on a transmission tariff filing with FERC. In re Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 295 B.R. 635, 667 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003).
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companies and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT").28
The case provides a clear illustration of why federal courts need to
revisit the filed rate doctrine in the deregulatory environment.
The claim, brought by Texas Commercial Energy ("TCE"),
alleged that twenty-four defendants, including TXU Energy, Inc.,
American Electric Power, Inc., and other energy marketers within
ERCOT engaged in anticompetitive market abuses in violation of
federal and state antitrust laws as well as fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, defamation, business
disparagement, civil conspiracy, and malicious and willful/flagrant
conduct under state law.2 9 TCE alleged that these wrongful acts
caused prices in the Balancing Energy Service Market ("BES
market")-a bid-based market for short-term power-to rise
drastically, forcing TCE to pay higher prices in the BES market and
forcing it to withdraw credit-based collateral from its bilateral
partners.
As is typical in most cases involving the filed rate doctrine, the
U.S. District Court in Texas dismissed TCE's lawsuit without
addressing the substantive merits of the market abuse claims.3 1
Although FERC possesses no authority over the Texas electricity
market, the court reasoned that the doctrine is intended to allow
markets to operate under rules approved by state regulators.2 In
declining to consider the merits of the federal antitrust claim, the
court reasoned that the agency charged by the state legislature with
overseeing the Texas electricity market, the Public Utility
Commission of Texas ("PUCT"), possesses the "institutional
competence to address rate-making issues in the BES market, one of
the principles underlying the filed rate doctrine.1 3 The court
observed that PUCT is required by statute to ensure "safe, reliable,
and reasonably priced electricity," including in BES markets.3 4 The
court noted, for example, that in August 2001 the Market Oversight
Division of PUCT ordered market participants to return $30 million
in illicit profits due to abusive and improper scheduling practices in
the BES market." In addition, rates in the BES market were

28. Tex. Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., No. C-03-249, 2004 WL
1777597, at *13-14 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2004).
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *14.
32. Id. at *9-10.
33. Id. at *10 (citing Sun City Taxpayers' Ass'n v. Citizens Util. Co., 45
F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1995).
34. TEx. UTIL. CODE. ANN. § 39.101(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
35. TCE, 2004 WL 1777597, at *10.
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capped at $1,000 per megawatt hour. 6 After finding that the filed
rate doctrine barred federal and state antitrust claims, the court
went on to determine that it also barred breach of contract and other
claims based on federal law.37 While the court's decision echoed the
approach of many other federal courts, which often presumptively
apply the filed rate doctrine to refuse consideration of a market
abuse claim, it also exposed substantial flaws with the doctrine in
the deregulatory environment.
To begin, the court's premise that PUCT's "institutional
competence" precluded consideration of the claim failed entirely to
confront the predicate issue of the agency's authority to remedy
harms. A regulator can only possess institutional competence if it
also has the authority to act. However, Texas has no express or
implied private right of action for injured purchasers and PUCT also
lacks authority to order refunds and damages. While the district
court referred to a previous $30 million settlement in Texas as
evidence of PUCT's power,38 the settlement depended entirely on
PUCT voluntarily assuming the role of brokering the agreement and
persuading the companies to disgorge some of their wrongfully
obtained profits. While PUCT may have the political power to
broker a deal, PUCT affords customers no formal complaint and
restitution process where they are injured in the BES market.
Even to the extent there is a complaint and adjudication process
for restitution, the filed rate doctrine precludes antitrust claims in
which treble damages are available to serve a more meaningful
deterrent function. Treble damages may not be necessary if agency
regulators enforce one hundred percent of market abuses (since one
of the main policy reasons behind treble damages is that the
likelihood of being sued is so low that meaningful penalities must be
high), but regulators lack the authority or resources to guarantee
restitution for every market abuse. The absence of restitution
coupled with the lack of meaningful penalties means that a Texassized enforcement gap will exist in ERCOT's deregulated wholesale
market.
Moreover, in discussing the filed rate doctrine the district court
in TCE completely confused federal and state law. The Keogh case,
on which the court relied extensively, involved the application of the
filed rate doctrine as a matter of federal law to suspend application
of federal antitrust laws to activities regulated by a federal agency.
Here, no federal agency had regulatory authority-only a Texas
state agency had any claim to regulatory authority. To the extent
36. Id. at *12.
37. Id. at *15-19.
38. Id. at *10.
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the doctrine involves state regulation, the tariff should be treated as
a matter of state law or, as is suggested below, under state action
immunity-the appropriate federalism defense to the antitrust laws.
The district court, however, did not reference a single Texas case
involving the filed rate doctrine, and failed completely to evaluate
whether state regulation of the BES market gives rise to state
action immunity.
D. A More Direct Solution: How Other Legal Doctrines Furtherthe
Legitimate Goals of the Filed Rate Doctrine
A plea for more careful application of the filed rate doctrine by
federal courts is not intended to suggest that the doctrine is without
purpose in every case. It is, however, a request that courts not
consider the filed rate doctrine automatic or presumptive, even in
cases involving complex regulatory filings. Such an approach is
consistent with Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,39 in which the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the tariff antitrust claims filed
by competitors because the court perceived only "a potential conflict"
with the Federal Power Commission's authority over transmission. °
More recently, in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,4' the Court held that courts clearly have the
authority to apply general antitrust principles to regulated firms,
although the 1996 Telecommunication Act's extensive provisions for
access make it unnecessary for courts to apply an essential facilities
doctrine under the antitrust laws to regulated firms.42
As a defense in cases involving energy markets, the filed rate
doctrine continues to serve an important purpose where three
conditions are present: where nondiscrimination remains an
important regulatory goal; where regulators possess the authority
and in fact do evaluate costs and prices; and where regulators
possess an adequate remedy for nondiscrimination. While cost-ofservice regulation may have justified a presumption against the
exercise of judicial authority in most cases, in a deregulated
environment it must be presumed that the agency has not engaged
in an extensive firm-specific evaluation of nondiscrimination.
Before resorting to the filed rate doctrine to decline
consideration of the merits of a dispute involving allegations of
market wrongs, a court first needs to evaluate whether an agency

39. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
40. Id. at 377.
41. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

42. Id. at 406, 410-11 (2004) (considering an essential facilities claim,
refusal to deal, and monopoly leveraging, but rejecting these claims on the
merits).
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accepting a tariff possesses the authority to protect against
nondiscrimination and uses it in ways that would present a conflict
with courts or make judicial enforcement unnecessary. In many
contexts, it is not at all clear that agency regulators possess the
authority to evaluate tariffs for nondiscrimination or to remedy
discrimination and other market abuses. In other contexts, as in
FERC's market-based tariffs, it is not at all clear that regulators
routinely evaluate and exercise authority to protect against
nondiscrimination.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected the
presumption that the filed rate doctrine applies to market-based
rates. California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC held that the filed rate
doctrine could apply to FERC's market-based rates, but only if
FERC did something more than make a cursory finding of no
market power in accepting a rate filing.43 FERC also needed to
exercise remedial authority to more actively monitor market-based
rates for market abuses. If FERC does not do this, the Ninth Circuit
panel suggested, "the purpose of the filed rate doctrine is
undermined" and "the tariff runs afoul of... the FPA.' 4 4 Otherwise,
an enforcement gap-as in Texas-will exist.
Nondiscrimination is a questionable regulatory goal in today's
regulatory environment, in which markets, not regulators, are
increasingly determining prices. It should no longer give rise to a
presumptive filed rate defense. In addition, federal courts have at
their disposal commonly used doctrines that better promote the
other purposes of the filed rate doctrine-federal preemption and
deference. There is no reason to give a filed tariff an independent
legal effect in order to further these goals.
Courts, for example, routinely find that national regulatory
programs preempt state law remedies for breach of contract and
tort. Such determinations, however, are not automatic. Instead,
courts carefully evaluate the scope of the regulatory scheme and the
extent to which it presents a conflict with state remedies. By
contrast, courts applying the filed rate doctrine as in Norwood often
use the mere existence of a filed tariff to imply federal preemption,
with little or no analysis of whether a regulatory conflict in fact
exists. Borrowing from federal preemption analysis, courts should
generally apply a presumption against preemption in this context.
In addition, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction-widely used in
federal judicial proceedings involving agency regulation-makes it
unnecessary for courts to apply the filed tariff doctrine in order to
further the goal of agency deference. While the filed tariff doctrine
43. 383 F.3d 1006, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2004).
44. Id. at 1016.
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bars both present and future claims, primary jurisdiction does not
confer complete immunity to the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.
Instead, in applying the doctrine, courts temporarily stay any
judicial enforcement pending agency regulation of the conduct at
issue. As Professor Louis Jaffe recognized long ago, the application
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction emphasizes that referral of a
matter from a court to an agency is not based solely on agency
expertise, but on the entire statutory scheme.45 Thus, its inquiry is
more suited to the problem federal courts routinely address in
asserting or declining jurisdiction over a matter within a federal
agency's jurisdiction: whether an exercise of judicial power unduly
trespasses onto agency expertise and decision-making authority in
enforcing regulatory goals. Primary jurisdiction provides a less
blunt tool for courts to apply agency deference in a dual jurisdiction
enforcement context involving both federal agencies and courts, as
frequently arises under the antitrust laws.
Finally, in antitrust cases, such as TCE's complaint against
TXU Energy and other suppliers potentially regulated by a state
agency, the filed rate doctrine is a completely inappropriate-and
astonishingly overbroad-defense to the claim. Apart from this
case, it seems that the filed rate doctrine has never been extended to
such a context, particularly since an alternative doctrine is available
to deal with deference to the state regulator. State action immunity
is an important federal defense to the application of the antitrust
laws. This judicially created antitrust defense originated when the
Supreme Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a California
marketing program brought by a grower because the program
derived "its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
As modern courts apply the doctrine, "[f]irst, the
of the state. 4
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy';4 7 second, the policy must be
'actively supervised' by the State itself.
The Texas federal district court that dismissed TCE's complaint
failed to make any effort to determine whether the supplier's alleged
misdeeds were immune under the federal antitrust laws given state
regulatory action. Indeed, since Texas affirmatively adopted the
BES as a competitive market model but did not give PUCT plenary
45. Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1037, 1057
(1964) (observing that "[a] special problem arises where the administrative
agency is not given jurisdiction to award reparations," specifically mentioning
the FPC, FERC's predecessor).
46. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
47. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (citing City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)).
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enforcement authority over suppliers, a claim of state action
immunity in this case would have been unlikely to succeed.
These alternative legal doctrines are much more precise and
effective means of promoting the goals of federal preemption and
agency deference than the filed rate doctrine. Unlike the filed rate
doctrine, they are not triggered by firm-specific actions but focus on
the agency regulator's authority and actions. In this sense, they
provide a more complete picture of the public interest in ensuring
some enforcement of legal standards against market abuses in
energy markets than would overbroad resort to the filed rate
doctrine. To the extent the filed rate doctrine is purely a matter of
state law, courts should apply it with similar enforcement concerns
in mind. As a matter of federal law, in most instances involving
energy regulation today, the filed rate doctrine's goals could readily
be served if lawyers and courts were to look to other legal rules.
As a recent trade press article suggests, applying the filed rate
doctrine in deregulated wholesale markets is akin to pounding "a
square peg into a round hole.' 8 Ultimately, if competitive markets
are to succeed, Congress must explicitly detariff electric power, in a
manner similar to the deregulation of telecommunications markets.
Indeed, H.R. 6, the proposed "Energy Policy Act of 2003,'" 9 would
have moved the basic authority to set rates from FERC to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, making the death of the
filed tariff shield a fait accompli in the electric power and natural
gas settings.5 0 Even if FERC were to move in this direction on its
own-regulating markets over prices-the question of injury to
those losing money due to market manipulation will likely be
resolved by courts.5 ' In the meantime, courts would best serve the
development of competitive energy markets by looking to alternative
legal doctrines to serve the purposes of the filed rate doctrine. Rate
and tariff filings in the deregulated energy context should be of no
less legal consequence than other regulatory instruments. But they
also should not be of any more legal consequence.
III.

USING PUBLIC LAW TO MITIGATE PRIVATE MANIPULATION OF
STATE AND LOCAL MONOPOLY REGULATION

The deference trap of public law may also have implications for
the formulation of state regulation in deregulated industries. If
48. Richard Stavros, Lost in Translation: Critics Say FERC's Filed Rate
Doctrine Is Wrong for the Times, PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2004, at 4.
49. H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (2003).
50. H.R. REP. No. 108-375, at 297 (2003); see also Robert C. McDiarmid,
Trading Spaces? Will the CFTC Move into FERC's House?, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Jan. 2004, at 40.
51. McDiarmid, supra note 50, at 42.
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courts are too deferential to state and local regulators, deregulated
markets may result in more-not less-use of the political process to
engage in socially harmful rent seeking. The political and economic
consequences of rent seeking are well chronicled by public choice
theorists, 2 but in the legal realm these concerns play out in the
context of the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution
and state action immunity to antitrust enforcement.
The "dormant" commerce clause, derived from the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution,3 limits the power of a state to enact
barriers to interstate commerce that blatantly discriminate against
out-of-state businesses or which have the effect of bringing about
such discrimination. 54 At the core of dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence is a norm of barrier-free interstate markets except in
very limited circumstances, such as where a state itself is a market
participant. 5 The doctrine can be conceptualized as responding to a
type of contractual incompleteness-due to transaction costs, states
may find it difficult to bargain with each other to ensure that trade
barriers are not harmful to overall social welfare. An individual
state's approach to monopoly regulation may impose spillover costs
for other jurisdictions. By striking state legislation that does so,
rather than deferring to state political processes, the dormant
commerce clause works to internalize these costs.
While the dormant commerce clause is pro-competitive (and
hence anti-protectionist) in spirit-indeed, it is anti-regulation in
spirit to the extent it protects competition in the external marketstate action immunity from antitrust enforcement is seemingly proregulation, presenting an interesting apparent contrast in goal and
approach.
State action immunity suspends federal antitrust

52. See supra note 2.
53. The Commerce Clause provides that "[tihe Congress shall have
Power... [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The "dormant" commerce clause, often referred to as the
"negative" commerce clause, embodies the notion that the grant of authority to
Congress to regulate interstate commerce carries with it implied restrictions on
the ability of states to initiate regulations affecting interstate commerce.
54. The evolution of the dormant commerce clause can be traced back to
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Examples of the doctrine being
used to strike down offending state programs abound. See, e.g., Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); S. Pac.
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
55. On the market-participant exception, see infra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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enforcement under the Sherman and Clayton Acts56 -statutes
designed to enhance competition and free trade norms-where a
state actively supervises the private activity. 57 For example, priceregulated public utilities, including electric and telecommunications
monopolies, have long escaped the scrutiny of antitrust enforcement
for their regulated activities. Rate proceedings have served to police
concerns with the exercise of market power. With deregulation,
however, there is widespread recognition that antitrust laws may
play an increasingly important role in deregulated industries, such
as telecommunications, electric power, and natural gas." To the
extent state regulation is more likely to be incomplete in a
deregulated environment, immunity from antitrust enforcement
must be approached with extreme caution. State action immunityonce widely taken for granted by firms in the electric power and
telecommunications industries-should no longer automatically bar
antitrust suits in utility industries any more than does the filed
tariff doctrine. The erosion of immunity will greatly increase the
uncertainty that historically regulated monopolies face in
deregulated markets, yet courts have not taken a principled
approach to deciding when to suspend state action immunity for

56. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992); City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); S. Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984);
New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
57. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105-06 (1980) (refusing to grant state action immunity where the program
at issue was not actively supervised by the state).
58. See, e.g., Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation:A New Focus for
a Competitive Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2000); Jade Alice Eaton,
Recent United States Department of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility
Industry, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 857 (1994); Craig A. Glazer & M. Bryan Little, The
Roles of Antitrust Law and Regulatory Oversight in the Restructured Electricity
Industry, ELECTRICITY J., May 1999, at 21; William J. Kolasky, Network Effects:
A ContrarianView, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 577 (1999); John Burrit McArthur,
Anti-Trust in the New [De]Regulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1

(1997);

Thomas

A.

Piraino,

Jr.,

A

Proposed Antitrust Analysis of

Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 Wisc. L. REV. 639; William J. Baer,

FTC Perspectives on Competition Policy and Enforcement Initiatives in Electric
Power, Address Before the Conference on the New Rules of the Game for
Electric Power: Antitrust and Anticompetitive Behavior (Dec. 4, 1997),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/elecl204.htm; Robert Pitofsky,
Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches,
Remarks Before the Glasser LegalWorks Seminar on Competitive Policy in
Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches (Mar. 10, 1997),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/newcomm.htm.
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utility industries.
Just as deference should have no place in the context of the
dormant commerce clause, a deference approach to state action
immunity can be harmful in deregulated markets. A principled
approach to state action immunity in the context of economic
regulation would not accept state regulation at face value as
providing for immunity from antitrust enforcement. As a starting
point, it must be recognized that other legal doctrines, such as the
dormant commerce clause, play an important role in limiting stateassisted monopoly and the scope of state regulation. On the
conventional understanding, the dormant commerce clause and
state action immunity from antitrust enforcement seem
inconsistent, even contradictory, in their overall objectives. One
doctrine is designed to protect against state regulation that rises to
protectionist levels and impedes external markets, while the other
allows state regulation to trump federal competition policies. Put
another way, one doctrine is oriented towards free trade, while the
other favors-and may even encourage-state-sanctioned monopoly.
At their core, however, both doctrines deal with the permissible
boundaries of monopoly, a fundamental organizational form for
Unless carefully
many regulated and deregulated firms.
approached, these doctrines can present a tension for the law of
regulated industries.
A focus on the harms associated with judicial deference
illustrates how these two doctrines have much more common ground
than either judicial doctrine, or most commentators, recognize. Both
doctrines facilitate cooperation in the public governance process in
order to sustain background norms of competition-the dormant
commerce clause concerns itself with the external market, while
state action immunity concerns itself primarily with the internal
market. But the doctrinal convergence is not limited to mere procompetitive policies that promote commercial exchange. Examining
how these doctrines might encourage a type of deference to state
and local regulation highlights their unified purpose-limiting the
negative impact of interest group capture of the state regulatory
process without completely prohibiting rent-seeking behavior. At
their core, the fundamental goal of both doctrines is to protect a
political process that facilitates regulatory contracts by tempering
self-interested interference that degrades cooperative norms
between the states, including a norm of free exchange of commerce
between states.59 A bargaining perspective on regulation advances
59. For further elaboration of this argument, see Jim Rossi, Political
Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust
Federalism,83 WASH. U.L.Q. (forthcoming 2005).
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the case for viewing the two doctrines as close cousins, if not
siblings, in a family of legal doctrines that provides background
norms, not only for the operation of American capitalism, but also
for its governance. This has particularly important implications for
the role of courts in considering antitrust cases in a deregulated
environment. Particularly, it suggests that the standard of review
applied by federal courts in the context of economic regulation
should go beyond mere deference to state politics in both
constitutional and antitrust federalism contexts. Public law, and in
particular judicial review, should police strategic manipulation of
state regulators in considering dormant commerce clause challenges
to state regulation, as well as in the context of gatekeeping for
antitrust enforcement pursuant to the application of state action
immunity.
A.
The Dormant Commerce Clause:MonitoringAcceptable Levels
of Regulation
Although it is not an express mandate of the text of the U.S.
Constitution's Commerce Clause, the dormant commerce clause
doctrine limits the power of state governments to impair free trade.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes once remarked:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we
lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States. For one in my
place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are
not trained to national views and how often action is taken
60
that embodies what the Commerce Clause was meant to end.
Among recent judicial skeptics, such as Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the doctrine is referred to as the "negative" commerce
clause, indicating its lack of textual basis in the Constitution.6'
Notwithstanding the lack of textual support for the doctrine in the
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 295-96 (1921).
61. Skeptics believe that the purposes of the dormant commerce clause can
readily be served by other more textually explicit constitutional doctrines, such
as the Import-Export Clause of Article I, Section 10 or the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. These alternatives are not without
their own critics. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The ImportExport Clause, and Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 155 (1999); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88
MINN. L. REV. 384 (2003). However, for purposes of this Article, let it suffice it
to emphasize that the alternatives would make protections against interstate
regulatory barriers much narrower.
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Constitution, the jurisprudence of the dormant commerce clause has
a long-standing basis in American constitutional jurisprudence. As
Justice Cardozo famously remarked, the Commerce Clause prohibits
any state law that burdens interstate commerce "when the avowed
purpose of the [law], as well as its necessary tendency, is to suppress
or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states."62
This general principle was invoked to strike a New York regulatory
scheme that had been used to deny a license to an out-of-state milk
processing facility. 3 Since the licensing provision had been enacted
"solely [for] protection of local economic interests, such as supply for
local consumption and limitation of competition," it was found to be
unconstitutional.64
Since the 1980s, when deregulation began to take hold in a
variety of industries, the Supreme Court has addressed dormant
commerce jurisprudence on several occasions. One of its cases on
the topic, General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,65 evaluated Ohio's
differential tax burdens for in-state and out-of-state natural gas
suppliers but refused to find a violation of the dormant commerce
clause on the particular facts that had been raised. General Motors,
which mounted a legal challenge to Ohio's differential tax, was a
large enough customer to purchase its gas from the open market
(rendered competitive by national regulators) rather than bundled66
from a state-regulated local distribution company ("LDC").
However, absent competition between the LDC and the open market
serving General Motors, the Court reasoned, "there can be no local
preference, whether by express discrimination against interstate
commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the dormant
Commerce Clause may apply."67 The case illustrates how intrastate
regulation, which may reject competition (as where, for example,
state regulators retain jurisdiction over retail rates), poses a
potential tension under the dormant commerce clause, which
protects interstate competition where national regulators have made
a policy decision favoring competitive markets. FERC clearly has
made such a decision in the context of the wholesale power market,
bringing the dormant commerce clause into relevance.
Other recent cases extend the dormant commerce clause beyond
merely protecting the external (interstate) market.
In C&A
62. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (striking down a
New York Law that set minimum prices that all milk dealers were required to
pay New York milk producers).
63. Id. at 520, 527.
64. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949).
65. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
66. Id. at 285.
67. Id. at 300.
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Court

invalidated a municipally-imposed monopoly over nonrecyclable
solid waste collected for processing and transfer. 69 To guarantee a
minimum stream of revenues for the project, the town of
Clarkstown, New York, adopted a flow control ordinance, allowing
the private operator of a transfer station to collect a fee of $81 per
ton-in excess of the disposal cost of solid waste in the private
market.7 ° C&A Carbone, Inc., processed solid waste and operated a
recycling center, as it was permitted to do under the Clarkstown
flow control ordinance."
The flow control ordinance required
companies like Carbone to bring nonrecylable waste to the locally
franchised transfer station and to pay a fee, while prohibiting them
from shipping the waste themselves. 72 "[A] financing measure," the
flow control ordinance ensured that "the town-sponsored facility will
be profitable, so that the local contractor can build it and
Clarkstown can buy it back at nominal cost in five years. " 3 The
Court reasoned that the local law violated the dormant commerce
clause because in "practical effect and design" it barred out-of-state
sanitary landfill operators
from participating in the local market for
S
74
solid waste disposal.
In so reasoning, the majority drew from a
1925 case, written by Justice Brandeis, in which the court held that
a "statute prohibit[ing] common carriers from using state highways
over certain routes without a certificate of public convenience" and
necessity was unconstitutional.75
If a municipal government itself were to create and own the
facility, this would bring the monopoly within an exemption to the
dormant • commerce
clause known as the market-participant
76
exemption.
In creating monopolies, however, local governments
68. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
69. Id. at 389.
70. Id. at 387.
71. Id. at 387-88.
72. Id. at 388.
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 389, 394.
75. Id. at 394 (citing Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1925)).
Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court:
[The statute's] primary purpose is not regulation with a view to
safety or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of
competition. It determines, not the manner of use, but the persons by
whom the highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some
persons while permitting it to others for the very same purpose and in
the same manner.
Buck, 267 U.S. at 315-16.
76. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-36 (1980); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806-09 (1976). While many have
criticized this exemption to dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, it is
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frequently work with private firms, using the advantages of the
below-market interest rates from non-taxable
state -subsidies,
bonds, and the ability to bypass state or local restrictions on use of
municipal tax powers, for example-to assist firms and create
incentives for them to provide service. Since municipal governments
often help to pay for privately operated infrastructure, such as
waste disposal facilities, through the issuance of bonds, it is
understandable that a local government may want to create a
monopoly in order to ensure that the facility maintains sufficient
revenues to cover its costs and to avoid jeopardizing the
government's bond rating. Such facilities are allowed to collect
charges, which serve the same basic function as a tax. If the
government itself were to build, own, and operate a facility, the
political process would impose a general tax, but with private
operations subsidized by a state or locally enforced monopoly, the
tax implications of such projects are obscured. The town of
Clarkstown, New York, for example, guaranteed revenue for its solid
waste transfer station-it promised a minimum of 120,000 tons of
waste per year, allowing a private firm to make more than $9.7
million in annual revenue-and, after a period of five years, the
town agreed to buy it for one dollar.7" One way of understanding the
Court's rejection of the Clarkstown flow control ordinance is to view
it as based on the Court's concerns with impermissible governmentassisted monopolies against the backdrop of interstate competition.
The basic animating principle of recent commerce clause cases
has frequently been described as the protection against
"discriminat[ion] between in-state and out-of-state competitors." 78 If

these decisions are taken at face value, the Supreme Court's
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence might be said to embrace a
pro-competition stance, consistent with the ideology and goals of a
neoclassical economics framework of federalism. In Tracy, for
example, Justice Souter, writing for the Court, stated, "[tihe
dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and participants in
defended as a pragmatic balance between competing federalism concerns. Dan
T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH.L. REV. 395, 398 (1989). The exemption is limited
and is not automatically available where the state could expand into the
market; to avail itself of the exemption the state must establish that it is a
market participant and may not use mere contractual privity to immunize
downstream regulatory conduct in a market in which it is not a direct
participant. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 89
(1984).
77. C&A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 387.
78. Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1223 (1998).

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

markets, not taxpayers as such."79 He bolstered this vision of the
dormant commerce clause by referencing the famous words of
Justice Jackson:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in
the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export,
and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations
exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has
given it reality. 0
This neoclassical view of the dormant commerce clause sees the
role of federal courts as protecting states from interfering with the
economic exchange of a free market economy."' Under this view, the
primary purpose of the dormant commerce clause is to guard
against balkanization by protecting free trade from state
government interference in the external market.
It would be a mistake, however, to read the dormant commerce
clause as a constitutional mandate for competition, let alone
deregulation. As dormant commerce clause jurisprudence itself
recognizes, there are exceptions to the dormant commerce clause
where the state itself takes on the role of market participant.
Further, the dormant commerce clause allows substantial state
government intervention in the setting of prices, subsidies, and
taxes, so long as a state does not engage in differential treatment in
the same market in ways that burden interstate competition.
Moreover, since the dormant commerce clause is not derived from
the express language of the U.S. Constitution, Congress can override
it by adopting a national policy that preempts, or overrides, the
competitive market between individual states. General Motors
Corp. v. Tracy, for example, seems to carve out a safe harbor for
state regulation of natural gas distribution. Under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the express authority to establish an agency
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), giving it
jurisdiction to regulate railroad rates previously left to individual

79. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300 (1997).
80. Id. at 299-300 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 539 (1949)).
81. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 428 (1982); Steven Gey, The Political Economy of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1989-90); McGreal,
supra note 78, at 1222-23.
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"Our Constitution," the late Julian Eule wrote, "did not

attempt to solve economic parochialism by an express prohibition
against interference with free trade. Instead, it shifted legislative
power over economic ' 82matters that affect more than one state to a
single national body."
To take a more modern example than the now-defunct ICC
railroad regulation regime, Congress has since created FERC, which
has made a major policy choice to implement regional competitive
wholesale power markets. Congress has the power to override
FERC's decision to implement regional competitive wholesale
markets, but no one has seriously proposed this. Alternatively,
Congress might expand FERC's jurisdiction, taking some or all
regulatory authority over retail markets away from state regulators.
If it were to do so, by occupying the lawmaking field, Congress
might preclude states from enacting some laws that discriminate
against out-of-state suppliers in deregulated wholesale markets;
again, however, Congress has not done so. Congress's inaction,
however, does not mean that preemption plays no role in this
context. Congress's acquiescence in FERC's competitive policies
serves as the legal source for a type of federal preemption of
individual states acting in ways that impair commerce between the
states. Absent a change in federal policy, state efforts to curtail
competition in wholesale electric power markets could be suspect
under the dormant commerce clause to the extent they undermine
While a federal
the interstate markets created by FERC.
market
norms
is based on a
preemption argument for interstate
positive legal source of congressional or federal agency enactments
which preclude contrary state laws, the dormant commerce clause
also arguably finds some source in the cooperative behavior between
two or more states that have adopted a competitive norm of
exchange in which Congress acquiesces.8
Many have suggested that the neoclassical account of the
dormant commerce clause-as a legal source of free trade policies
between the states-is flawed.8 4 An alternative view understands
the dormant commerce clause not as inherently protecting
competition itself, let alone free markets, but as protecting a
political process that makes markets possible. For instance, in West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 5 the Supreme Court struck down a
Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme for milk, even where the tax

82. Eule, supra note 81, at 430.
83. See Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence
L. REV. 1764 (2004).

and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN.

84. See sources cited supra note 81.
85. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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operated neutrally without regard to the milk's place of origin, but
where tax revenues went into a subsidy fund and were distributed
solely to Massachusetts milk producers.86
In writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens embraced a political process account of the
dormant commerce clause, in which its role is seen as
representative-enforcing in a manner similar to Carolene Product's
famous footnote four.
As Justice Stevens remarked in striking
down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn Creamery:
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue
here, are generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on
interstate commerce, in part because "[t]he existence of major
in-state interests adversely

affected

.

. . is a powerful

safeguard against legislative abuse."
However, when a
nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of the
groups hurt by the tax, a State's political processes can no
longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one
of the in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against
the tax has been mollified by the subsidy. 8
Rather than inherently protecting competition and free
markets, the purpose of the dormant commerce clause doctrine can
be understood within the framework of Madisonian democracy as
well as efficiency-specifically, limiting welfare reducing interest
group rent seeking in the state regulatory process.
Unlike the traditional public choice critique, which condemns
all state and local rent seeking, the political process account of the
dormant commerce clause targets only those rent seeking laws that
restrain commerce pursuant to implicit or explicit contracts between
other states. The state political process allows states, like the U.S.
Congress, to adopt rent-seeking legislation in the form of regulation,
subsidies, and taxes. However, an individual state cannot enact a
law that undermines a desirable pro-commerce regime that has been
put into place through the implicit or explicit cooperation of states,
any more than it can undermine a pro-commerce regime adopted
formally by Congress or a federal agency (under the preemption
clause).
86. Id. at 191-92.
87. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
John Hart Ely has applied the representation-reinforcing role of Carolene
Products to equal protection jurisprudence. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST:

A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-88 (1980).

88. 512 U.S. at 200 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981) (other internal citations omitted)).
89. For an elaboration of this view, see Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful
Mend: A Game TheoreticalAnalysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).
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Some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in state
and local political processes. For example, rent seeking in the form
of a neutral corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent seeking in
the setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely
permissible, and subject only to the safeguards of the local political
process. However, rent seeking in the form of exclusionary
regulation that limits access to the interstate market is more
suspect as an approach to regulating economic matters, especially
where market exchange is the background norm as a matter of
national policy.
Florida's Supreme Court rejected a dormant
commerce clause challenge to the use of the state's restrictive power
plant siting statute to restrict the building of new plants by out-ofstate suppliers," but the inadequacy of a record establishing
discrimination against out-of-state merchant suppliers may have
impeded the development of this legal argument. At a minimum,
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence would require states and
localities to explain how regulatory actions and legislation
restricting power supply in the wholesale market or transmission
expansion might serve legitimate purposes, such as environmental
or consumer protection.
More challenging is the constitutional status of state or locally
franchised monopolies against the backdrop of dormant commerce
jurisprudence.
On the political process account, the town of
Clarkstown, New York violated the dormant commerce clause by
granting a monopoly that imposed a veiled tax on users of waste
disposal outside of the locally sponsored facility, including out-ofstate use. Its monopoly franchise was invalidated. 91 In Carbone,
Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Blackmun, arguing that the majority had ignored the
distinction between private and public enterprise and that the flow
control ordinance monopoly is easily distinguished from the
"entrepreneurial favoritism" the Court had previously condemned as
protectionist.92
What distinguishes this monopoly from a
constitutionally permissible monopoly?
Or do local and state
electric, natural gas, and telecommunications monopolies risk the
same fate if they do not open their service territories and network
facilities to competitors? The historical lack of a background norm
of competition excuses many historical monopolies from the
90. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000).
91. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
92. Id. at 416 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, "The
Commerce Clause was not passed to save the citizens of Clarkstown from
themselves." Id. at 432. Thus, the dissent rejects extending the political
process account beyond scenarios that discriminate between local and out-oftown participants.
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constitutional reach of the dormant commerce clause: if there is no
interstate market, a state or locally imposed monopoly cannot
discriminate against out-of-state commerce. With the development
of interstate markets in telecommunications and electric power,
however, more difficult questions emerge. Will any state or local
monopoly raise commerce clause problems? For example, is it
unconstitutional for a utility to impose a surcharge on all users of its
distribution service, regardless of whether they purchase their
power from local or out-of-state suppliers?
If a municipality, such as the town of Clarkstown, operates a
government-owned monopoly over telecommunications or electric
distribution service, the market participant exception to the
dormant commerce clause shields its conduct from the reach of the
commerce clause. Franchised private utilities-such as investorowned utilities-pose a potential problem but are not necessarily
unconstitutional, even under the political process account of the
dormant commerce clause. The political process account, however,
warns state and local governments to approach the financing of such
operations with care. In the Carbone case, the town of Clarkstown
promised to make up losses from operating the transfer facility at
competitive rates, presumably by taking these losses out of its
general revenues.93 What the dormant commerce clause seems to
prohibit is a local government explicitly indemnifying a private
monopoly out of the public fisc, even where it imposes the same
monopoly and fees on both in- and out-of-state providers of service.
The Takings Clause does not require governments to take on such
obligations, but the dormant commerce clause may prohibit them if
they are the result of rent seeking that imposes burdens on the
interstate market. Further, as in Carbone, authorizing abovemarket fees solely for purposes of maintaining the monopoly may be
constitutionally suspect. As we move from local to state monopoly
franchises, concerns with a single firm capturing the political
process are weaker-a single firm that dominates municipal politics
may have little power in state-wide regulatory and political
processes. Thus, state-franchised monopolies may be more likely to
pass
constitutional
muster, but
even
neutral
financing
arrangements may be suspect if they favor local enterprise and have
the "practical effect and design" of impeding out-of-state
competitors.
As an example, consider recent state moratoria on the siting of
new electric power generation and transmission facilities.
The
Florida example, mentioned above, concerned power generation, but
electric power transmission line siting poses a much greater problem
93. Id. at 387.
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for deregulated markets, as it threatens to limit access to essential
network facilities. A recent example of how state and local siting of
transmission may interfere with deregulated wholesale power
markets involves the Cross-Sound transmission project. Regulatory
officials in the state of Connecticut have strongly opposed the CrossSound Cable, a twenty-three-mile merchant transmission line that
would allow Long Island Power Authority ("LIPA") to import power
to Brookhaven, Long Island from New Haven, Connecticut, causing
significant delays in the operation of the project. The project was
built in 2002, following FERC's approval of retail sales at negotiated
transmission rates 94 and permit approvals by the Army Corp of
Engineers, the New York Public Service Commission, the
Connecticut Siting Council, and the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection. 95 It complied with all state siting and
environmental statutes, except for a provision of its state-issued
permit which required its lines to be buried at a certain depth.96
Expansion of transmission access to locations such as New York
City would provide important capacity, and may have helped in
absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated the
Summer 2003 blackout.97
In burying the transmission line, the project sponsor
encountered some problems. It discovered hard sediments and
bedrock protrusions along portions of the route, and immediately
notified the Army Corps and the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection. 9
Some Connecticut officials cited
environmental concerns in support of their opposition to the project,
such as impacts on shellfish beds and dredging operations into the
New Haven Harbor. The transmission line was built, however, and
according to the project's CEO the line was "buried to the permit
depth along 98 percent of the entire span, and over 90% of the route
within the Federal Channel to an average of 50.7 feet below mean
lower low water, well below the required level of minus 48 feet."99
Nevertheless, Connecticut's officials' opposition kept the
94. TransEnergie U.S., Ltd., 91 F.E.R.C. 61,230 (2000).
95. See Regional Energy Reliability & Security: DOE Authority to Energize
the Cross Sound Cable: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Energy & Air
Quality of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 56 (2004)
[hereinafter Regional Energy] (statement of Jeffrey A. Donahue, Chairman &
CEO, Cross-Sound Cable Co., LLC).
96. Id.
97. The technical advantage to operating two transmission lines between
Connecticut and Long Island, as opposed to one, is that this would allow electric
power to travel in a semi-circular loop-in and out of Long Island, depending on
load. Id. at 56-57.
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id.
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transmission line from becoming operational until 2004.00 This may

be a well-intentioned dispute over environmental regulation, but the
line was not only opposed by environmental interests in the state of
Connecticut. As often is the case with blocking a new entrant to a
state's power industry, there was also an anticompetitive angle to
opposition to the Cross-Sound line. Northeast Utilities, a major
investor-owned utility whose customers reside primarily in
Connecticut (and which also services customers in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire), owns an older, competing transmission line
(the 1385 cable) that runs parallel to the Cross-Sound Cable and
supports updating its line over approving the Cross-Sound line, with
which it would compete, and has requested FERC to use its
authority under section 210 of the FPA to order New York to assist
in replacing the 1385 cable. 10 1
After the Cross-Sound transmission line was built, Connecticut
passed a moratorium on the siting of new or expanded transmission
lines across Long Island Sound, 10 2 effectively limiting the ability of
the project's sponsors to make the project comply with Connecticut's
The Cross-Sound cable was
understanding of the permits.
authorized to operate under an emergency order issued by the U.S.
Secretary of Energy following the August 2003 blackout, but that
order was lifted in early 2004, leaving the Cross-Sound line without
permission to go live.' °3 So effectively, the Cross-Sound cable was
completed in 2002 but remained dormant as a permanent
transmission alternative until Summer 2004 due to a regulatory
impasse between the state of Connecticut, on the one hand, and
Cross-Sound's investors and the state of New York, on the other.
As FERC Chairman Pat Wood indicated before Congress in May
2004, federal regulation seems ill-quipped to resolve the issue. 1°4 In
the context of the 1385 line dispute, LIPA requested that FERC use
its authority under the Federal Power Act to direct Cross-Sound to
recommence commercial operation of the line, notwithstanding the
However, although FERC has
objections of state regulators.
100. Conn. Governor Signs Moratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross
Sound in Limbo, POWER MARKETS WK., June 30, 2003, at 31.
101. Cross-Sound Cable Project Reenergized After PartiesReach Settlement,
FOSTER ELECTRIC REP.,

June 30, 2004, at 7.

102. Conn. Governor Signs Moratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross
Sound in Limbo, POWER MARKETS WK., June 30, 2003, at 31.
103. Regional Energy, supra note 95, at 40-41 (Statement of Hon. Patrick
Wood, III, Chairman, FERC). Under Section 202(c) of the FPA, the U.S.
Secretary of Energy can mandate operation of a transmission line over
objections of state regulators, but only in the context of an emergency-not
where it is merely found to be in the public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2000).
104. Regional Energy, supra note 95, at 39 (statement of Hon. Patrick Wood,
III, Chairman, FERC).
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embraced wholesale deregulation, FERC does not have the authority
to preempt the state environmental siting process over the
Connecticut's Attorney General, backed by
transmission line.
environmental interest groups and Northeast Utilities, has
threatened litigation if the Cross-Sound line is allowed to go live
of the existing transmission line
again, instead favoring expansion
15
owned by Northeast Utilities.

To the extent transmission remains entirely within the control
of local, rather than national, regulators, states have strong
incentives to protect their own incumbent firms or citizens, rather
than support interstate cooperative market norms. Only when
FERC threatened to approve expansion of the 1385 cable was FERC
able to force the parties to the bargaining table. 06 FERC could not
preempt the states and mandate operation of the Cross-Sound
transmission line, but the threat of FERC making a decision
elsewhere led stakeholders to negotiate a settlement, allowing the
line to operate.'o
The Cross-Sound transmission line is not a unique example of
state or local regulation blocking the expansion of infrastructure
that is critical to interstate power markets. As Ashley Brown and
Damon Daniels report, transmission expansion projects spawn
massive NIMBY (not in my backyard) concerns, frequently
generating state and local opposition. 10 8 To make matters worse,
many state legislatures fail to authorize state siting boards to even
take into account interstate concerns. Twenty-two states even
authorize localities to block transmission expansion projects. The
Cross-Sound transmission line illustrates the tension between state
siting laws (often used for environmental purposes) and
deregulation of the wholesale power market. FERC's statutory
jurisdiction over the matter is admittedly limited, since FERC
cannot preempt state siting laws.
However, to the extent FERC has deregulated wholesale power,
such disputes raise potential issues of great concern under the
dormant commerce clause. While the state of Connecticut certainly
105. Bruce W. Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORT.'S
SPARK, June 2004, at 1.
106. PartiesSet Deal to Energize Cross Sound Cable, INSIDE F.E.R.C., June
28, 2004, at 1.
107. Bruce Lambert, New York and ConnecticutAgree to End Cable Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at B6. Interestingly, the most vocal opponent of the
transmission line, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, was
excluded from the negotiations. Michele Jacklin, Editorial, They Can Bury the
Cable, but Not the Controversy, HARTFORD COURANT, July 7, 2004, at A9.
108. Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site: Site Without
Vision, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 25.
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may impose legitimate environmental restrictions on permits, its
moratorium raises serious anticompetitive concerns-particularly
where it is used to keep a project that has already been built from
becoming operational. The dormant commerce clause will be a
likely tool for challenging such restrictions, especially where, as in
Connecticut, competitors stand to benefit from the restriction. State
and local environmental regulation can survive such dormant
commerce clause challenges. However, refusing siting based on
state-based claims of need, or where in-state competitors are aligned
with environmental interests, will increasingly raise concerns under
the dormant commerce clause. In such a context, deference to state
regulators will impede interstate commerce, harming social welfare.
While such deference may not have mattered under cost-of-service
regulation due to the limited nature of interstate power markets,
with deregulation courts thus have an important role to play in
reviewing such challenges to state and local regulation.
B.
The Deference Trap of State Action Immunity in Deregulated
Markets
In contrast to the dormant commerce clause-an affirmative
restriction on state power to act derived from the constitution-state
action immunity is a defense to enforcement of the antitrust
statutes. 1 9 To the extent the state action defense provides private
firms immunity from antitrust liability, it encourages the formation
of state monopolies, or monopolistic conduct, where states intend to
take private conduct outside of the pale of antitrust enforcement.
This judicially created antitrust defense originated when the
Supreme Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a California
marketing program brought by a grower because the program
derived "its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
of the state."'10 Such immunity serves the federalism purpose of
facilitating participation in the state regulatory 2 process,"' which
lends legitimacy to the development of regulation.'

109. See supranotes 53-58 and accompanying text.
110. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
111. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the
Antitrust State-Action Doctrine:Balancing PoliticalParticipationand Economic
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism,75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1271 (1997).
112. The state action doctrine also may serve a judicial avoidance purpose,
providing federal courts a way of disposing of complex and technical issues,
especially in ways that have a binding impact on state law. Other legal
doctrines, such as abstention (which advises federal courts to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction out of comity), adequately protect the precedent-creating
risk of federal court review of state regulation. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D
ConstitutionalLaw § 122 (1998). Abstention can be invoked where a federal
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In applying state action immunity, the Supreme Court has
adopted a two-part test to determine which state regulations are
exempt from antitrust enforcement: "First, the challenged restraint
must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State
itself."" 3 This test seems simple enough. Only if a state law
expressly envisions monopolistic conduct and if the state actively
supervises such conduct, will the conduct escape antitrust
In application, though, courts have struggled in
enforcement.
applying state action immunity, often because within a state
different bodies take on the regulatory role and because the nature
of regulation varies so much from industry to industry.
State action immunity's application to local governments, such
as municipal bodies (as opposed to states) is one of the questions
that has presented the most difficult challenges for courts." 4 Local
government lawmaking presents an opportunity for extension of the
political process insights of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
to the state action context. The Supreme Court has read state
action immunity narrowly in the context of municipal (as opposed to
Community Communications Co. v. City of
state) regulation.
Boulder,11 5 for example, subjected municipal governments to
antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Brennan distinguished between states regulating
as states-which are entitled to the state action defense under a
as
political
regulating
states
rationale-and
federalism

court is making a decision that has a binding effect on state law. By contrast,
in antitrust litigation courts are not normally passing judgment on the merits of
state regulation but are focused on the merits of private conduct under federal
law.
113. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
410 (1978) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)).
114. Commentary on the applicability of state action immunity to local
governments has been robust See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of
the "State-MunicipalAction" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEx. L. REV. 481 (1982); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,26 J. LAW & ECON.
23 (1983); Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v.

Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A.
Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and FederalAntitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 719 (1985); John E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust
L. REV. 23 (1984); Glen 0.
Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 FORDHAM
Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule Charter: Community

Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 S.CT. ECON. REV. 131 (1983); C. Paul
Rogers III, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a FederalistSystem, 1980 ARIZ. ST.
L. REV. 305.

115. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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subdivisions-which are exempt from antitrust enforcement only
insofar as they are implementing state policy but not when they are
acting as municipal governments only."6 The City of Boulder's
moratorium on cable television expansion was thus subject to
antitrust challenge because Colorado, at the state level, had not
clearly expressed a policy to regulate cable television; in fact, Justice
Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado had1 no
7 state-wide policy
regulation.
state
in
gap
a
was
there
at all-that
This rationale for narrowing the availability of the state action
defense for municipal governments is striking in its similarity to the
political process account of dormant commerce jurisprudence. Like
the municipally franchised monopoly in Carbone, which the Court
believed to impair external market competition, the City of
Boulder's moratorium on cable effectuates a tax on its citizens that
goes too far. This impairs internal market competition, and possibly
external competition as well. As such, a certain coherence, if not
convergence, exists between these two independent doctrines. To
the extent both doctrines respond to incompleteness in regulatory
law and emphasize the incentives private firms face in bargaining
with state and local governments in the lawmaking process, a
narrow reading of state action immunity to antitrust enforcement
against private firms is justified in the municipal context, for the
very same reasons that the political process account of the dormant
commerce clause makes sense."'
More recent cases, however, depart from the municipal-state
distinction in antitrust immunity that Justice Brennan laid down in
the context of cable television regulation. In Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire,"9 the Court abandoned the clear articulation
requirement in assessing municipal state action immunity.' 20
Instead, Justice Powell reasoned in his majority opinion that as long
as a state confers permissive authority in general terms for a
municipality to deal with a matter in the municipal government's
discretion, this is sufficient to exclude the conduct from antitrust

116. Id. at 54.
117. Id. at 55.
118. Reacting to the prospect of liability created by the City of Boulder case,
Congress abolished money damage liability under the antitrust laws for
municipalities, their officials, and private persons acting under the direction of
local governments and their officials in the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984. See H.R. REP. No. 98-965, at 2, 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4603, 4620-22. Congress continued, however, to authorize
antitrust liability for private conduct that is sanctioned or authorized by
municipal governments.
119. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
120. Id. at 43.
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Thus, when the state of Wisconsin granted
enforcement. 121
municipalities the authority to establish sewage treatment plants,
this impliedly granted municipal governments the power to make
decisions about who would be served. Justice Powell recognized that
municipalities may exercise "purely parochial public interests,"
12 2
which, at some level, could be subject to antitrust enforcement;
however, in his view, a state delegation to a municipal government
alone is sufficient to meet the "clearly expressed and fully
articulated" criterion of the state action immunity test, thus
exempting 1from
antitrust enforcement a large range of municipal
23
regulation.

In addition, state action immunity requires courts to determine
how active and involved a regulatory scheme must be for purposes of
deeming it "active supervision." In the Eau Claire case, however,
the Supreme Court effectively abandoned the requirement of state
supervision, at least insofar as it applies to municipalities. 24 In so
holding, the Court explained that the purpose of the state
supervision is to ensure that regulatory policies are pursued for
public purposes and not to enrich private actors. According to the
Court, "[wihere a private party is engaging in the anticompetitive
activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own25
interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State."
But, where a state has clearly authorized a municipality to act, the
Court reasoned that there is no such problem. Instead, the "only
real danger is that it will seek to further purely parochial public
interests at the expense of more overriding state goals." 26 Thus,
where it is clear that some clear state authorization exists, the
Court held that there is no need for the state to actively supervise
the municipality's regulation of the private activity.
Courts following this approach need only identify a clear
legislative purpose, but beyond this they engage in judicial
restraint, deferring to state monopoly regulation under the antitrust
laws. While deference has its appeal in a complex regulatory
environment, the Court's relaxation of a state supervision
requirement for municipalities is counterintuitive. The premise
that municipal regulation is not likely to be captured by private
interests at the expense of the public good ignores the high risk of
interest group capture at the local level, where the incentives for ex

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 42-44.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47.
Id.
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ante lobbying of the regulator are perhaps strongest. At the local
level, the costs to firms of organizing and lobbying regulators are
much lower than at the state level. Although the Court seems to
embrace a federalism-based formalism as a rationale for deference
to municipal regulation, this account of federalism proves too much.
It can result in state delegation to municipal governments with no
strings attached, insulating private behavior at the local level from
almost all antitrust enforcement. Further, it places focus on the
mere formalistic existence of state goals without addressing their
purpose. States, as well as municipal governments, sometimes
regulate in ways that allow private interests to place their own
economic well being ahead of the public good. Allowing the law to
insulate such private conduct from antitrust scrutiny may have
serious consequences in deregulated markets.
The Court's state action immunity cases in the context of
municipal regulation seem to view the clear articulation and active
supervision requirements as one and the same. In a more recent
case on the topic, however, the Court made it clear that the active
supervision requirement is alive and well as an independent
criterion where what is at issue is the conduct of state, as opposed to
municipal, regulators. In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.,127 the
Court addressed the application of state action immunity to the
rate-setting activities of title insurance companies in several
Most of the states regulating the title insurance
states. 128
defendants permitted private insurers to jointly file rates, which
state officials could review or allow to remain in effect.129 The record
of the case suggested that no significant review of the rates actually
took place by these states. 3 0 The FTC had conceded that the state
statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed rates met the
clear articulation requirement,13' but the Court found the agency's
review did not constitute active supervision and thus failed the
second step of Midcal.3 2 Hence, the allegedly anticompetitive acts of
the insurers could be challenged.
Since it plays a gate keeping function for antitrust enforcement,
127. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
128. Id. at 624-25.
129. Id. at 629.
130. Id. In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred. Id. at
630.
131. Id. at 631. Below, the Third Circuit, following a previous decision of the
First Circuit, held that the existence of a funded and authorized state program
met the active supervision requirement. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d
1122, 1137 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC,
908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st Cir. 1990)), rev'd, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
132. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 640; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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state action immunity will increasingly play an important role as
1 33
Yet, the gates largely
formerly regulated firms are deregulated.
remain closed, allowing private firms to escape antitrust scrutiny.
Despite Ticor's signal that active supervision is alive and well, lower
courts generally continue to take a deferential approach to state
action immunity. Even where what is at issue is state, not local,
regulation, and even where competitive markets for service are
emerging, lower courts are not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to
apply to private conduct in formerly regulated industries where
there is some state regulatory scheme, however incomplete it may
be.
Illustrative of this deferential and narrowing approach to
judicial review, courts have consistently provided for broad antitrust
immunity for electric utilities, despite the introduction of
competition to certain segments of the industry. For example, the
Tenth Circuit extended antitrust immunity to Oklahoma Gas and
Electric Company's ("OG&E") conduct based on evidence that the
state regulatory agency had "general supervision" authority over the
utility, "including the power to fix all of OG&E's rates for electricity
and to promulgate all the rules and regulations that affect OG&E's
services, operation, and management. " 13 4 The power to engage in
review alone was deemed sufficient for meeting the active
supervision requirement. While the Tenth Circuit cited a previous
case, which "found that the use of similar authority over an electric
utility satisfied the active supervision requirement " "' as a basis for
this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence of
the affirmative use of such authority by the regulator with respect to
the utility whose conduct was at issue.
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach
to state action. North Star Steel, a customer located within the
exclusive service territory of MidAmerican Energy Co., an electric
utility in Iowa, sought to purchase competitively priced electricity
and requested that MidAmerican wheel power to it.' 36 MidAmerican
refused, and North Star sued, alleging that the utility violated the
antitrust laws by refusing to allow access to its transmission lines. 37
133. See, Jeffery D. Schwartz, Comment, The Use of the Antitrust State
Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
1449 (1999).
134. Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d
1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001).
135. Id. (citing Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d
1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 1988)).
136. North Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d
732, 734 (8th Cir. 1999).
137. Id.
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The court found that active supervision of the utility's conduct
existed due to the fact that, by statute in Iowa, new customers were
assigned to exclusive service providers and that the regulator had
determined which provider should "occupy" the area in the event
there1.38was a conflict over which provider was in control of a given
The court found that Iowa's legislation "affirmatively
area.
expressed" a policy of displacing competition in the market for retail
electric service. 139 The court refused, however, to explore the
substantive basis for the agency's regulatory determinations in
defining exclusive service territories. For instance, even though the
state had experimented with limited "pilot" retail wheeling
programs, the court did not evaluate whether the state agency's
efforts to promote competition in power supply might coexist with
maintaining exclusive service territories over transmission and
distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on all of these
issues. In fact, the only regulatory action that was discussed by the
140
court related to the definition of distribution service territories,
not the allocation of power supply or generation. The court also
regimes have been held to
reasoned that "less pervasive regulatory
141
satisfy the active supervision prong."

One of these "less pervasive" regulatory regimes is state
For
prohibition of certain types of pro-competitive conduct.
example, according to Florida's regulators and courts, Florida has
adopted a statutory prohibition on retail electric competition,
outside of self-wheeling arrangements. Although Florida does not
have a clear legislative statement regarding the issue, Florida's
Public Service Commission ("PSC") prohibited retail wheeling to
provide access to competitive power supply outside of "self-wheeling"
arrangements (for example, a supplier transmitting power over the
utility's lines for the supplier's own use). 42 The Florida Supreme
Court held that cogenerators were not authorized under Florida law
Accepting both the
to sell their power in the retail market.'
regulation and the Florida Supreme Court's characterization of
Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit applied state action immunity to
preclude an antitrust action by a cogeneration facility against a

138. Id. at 738-39.

139. Id. at 738. Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the
Eighth Circuit assumed for collateral estoppel purposes that "under Iowa law
the exclusive service territory provisions include the generation of electricity for
retail sales." Id. at 737-38.
140. Id. at 739.
141. Id.

142.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.

r. 25-17.0882 (1985).

143. PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988).
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The
utility which refused to wheel power at a competitive rate.'
court reasoned that "the doors to the PSC were open to all with
standing to complain,"'4 but nowhere did the court identify how a
cogenerator might raise such issues before the Florida PSC.
Apparently, it could not, other than by challenging the agency rule
authorizing the anticompetitive conduct. One way of understanding
the claim raised before the Eleventh Circuit was as a collateral
attack on the agency rule based on a substantive violation of federal
antitrust law. The Eleventh Circuit opinion seems to suggest that
the existence of an agency rule authorizing anticompetitive conduct
is enough to trigger active supervision. If this holds, however, not
only can the actions of a state legislature insulate private conduct
from antitrust liability, a unilaterally adopted agency rule can also
excuse private conduct from antitrust enforcement, even if this rule
prohibits pro-competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.
Such a deferential approach to gatekeeping in antitrust
enforcement can have some serious implications for the enforcement
In California's
of antitrust laws in deregulated markets.
deregulated electric power market, for instance, wholesale power
suppliers possessing market power have allegedly engaged in tacit
collusion to withhold supply and thus artificially inflate their
prices. " 6 FERC may have made its own determinations that
individual firms lacked market power and approved market-based
tariffs. State agencies as well approved the sale of power by these
suppliers through the state-sanctioned market exchange. To the
extent that the behavior of these firms raises a plausible section 1
(or even a section 2) claim under the Sherman Act, the mere
existence of a state sanctioned and supervised market should not
give rise to state action immunity. Courts need to devise a more
principled way of assessing their gatekeeping function in such
contexts.
Rethinking JudicialDeference in State Action Immunity
Since Eau Claire, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
abandoned the political process-informed municipal-state distinction
in assessing state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. In
place of this perspective, courts serving as gatekeepers for antitrust
challenges to private conduct have adopted a highly deferential
stance to applying state action immunity. With a state-regulated
C.

144. TEC Congeneration, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 156770 (11th Cir. 1996).
145. Id. at 1570.
146. Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust
Enforcement in the CaliforniaElectricity Crisis, 55 HAST. L.J. 271 (2003).
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activity, courts reviewing private conduct under complex regulatory
schemes are increasingly likely to imply a regulatory policy, even
absent clear articulation of regulatory purpose by the state. The
active supervision prong of the doctrine is often judicially implied as
well. Courts generally do not evaluate the degree of scrutiny
provided by state or local regulators, let alone whether the purpose
of the supervision overlaps with the pro-competitive goals of the
Sherman Act. The result is a serious lapse of judicial gatekeeping in
the consideration of antitrust challenges to private conduct in
formerly regulated industries.
Judge Merrick Garland has been one of the strongest defenders
of this deferential approach to considering the relevance of state
He argues that there is no principled basis for
regulation.'4 7
distinguishing between municipalities and states for federal
antitrust law purposes. Put simply, his view is that state and local
legislation should not be assessed by the federal courts for their
Just as advocates of
efficiency effects in antitrust cases.
deregulatory takings try to reinvigorate Lochner v. New York in
determining government liability for regulatory transitions, Garland
sees relaxed state action immunity as invoking a Lochner-type
review of regulation.
Not every scholar agrees with the deference approach to state
action immunity defended by Judge Garland. Responding to Eau
Claire, John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address
the efficiency, and in particular the public choice, implications of
state and local legislation in deciding whether to invoke state action
immunity. 48 According to Wiley, if anticompetitive legislation is
inefficient and the result of producer-interest lobbying, state action
immunity should not protect it from invalidation under the
Sherman Act.' *9 In similar spirit, Matthew Spitzer argues that
federal courts should invalidate state or local legislation if it is
inefficient or if it transfers wealth from consumers to producers.15 °
John Cirace also argues that courts should employ an efficiency test
to assess the validity of state and local legislation under the
Sherman Act.'
Defenders of deference have responded by arguing that, in
effect, reviewing state and local laws for efficiency and public choice
147. See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic
Efficiency and the PoliticalProcess, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987).
148. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,99
HARv. L. REV. 713 (1986).
149. Id. at 788-89.
150. Matthew L. Spitzer, Antitrust Federalismand Rational Choice Political
Economy: A Critiqueof CaptureTheory, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1326 (1988).
151. Cirace, supra note 114, at 514-15.
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implications is tantamount to federal courts returning to Lochnerlike review, encroaching on the states' ability to engage in economic
regulation. Judge Garland, for example, favors exempting from
judicial review under the Sherman Act all regulatory actions by
state and local governments except for delegations of the power to
restrain the market to private parties. 52 But if judicial review of
private conduct is approached with care, a deferential stance to
antitrust immunity would certainly not be necessary to limit the
scope of judicial review. As Daniel Gifford has argued, federal
courts have the capacity to review state and local legislation without
directly addressing their substantive efficiency effects. 153 Gifford
would have courts apply the same "free market" approach in the
state action immunity context that they apply under the dormant
commerce clause. State action immunity would protect the internal
market from trade restraints, while the dormant commerce clause
would extend to the external market.
State action immunity from antitrust enforcement serves
purposes similar to those the political process account of the
dormant commerce clause embraces, but, apart from Gifford, courts
and commentators have only explicitly recognized the connection on
rare occasions."' For example, although they do not discuss the
similarities between the doctrines, Inman and Rubinfeld argue that
state action immunity should only be invoked where regulation
imposes substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests."' State
action immunity should not free all private monopolies from
antitrust enforcement but only those which are actively supervised
by the state for purposes of limiting the harms that flow from
unregulated monopoly. State supervision is not inherently anticommerce, but it recognizes the necessity of regulation to correct for
market failures. On this understanding, for state action immunity
to make sense in its application, enforcement of pro-commerce
norms is necessary where the federalism-based value of
participation comes into conflict with efficiency, as may occur if
state regulation creates spillover costs.
Here, state action immunity might take a lesson from its cousin,
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Specifically, in markets
with competitive background norms, courts must have a relatively
152. Garland, supra note 147, at 506-07.
153. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism,Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and
the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44
EMORY L.J. 1227, 1228-29 (1995).
154. One of those rare occasions is Parker v. Brown, which raised both
dormant commerce clause and antitrust challenges to the California raisin
marketing program. 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943).
155. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 111, at 1271-99.
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high doctrinal threshold for invoking a gatekeeping function, as they
do in determining when state action immunity precludes antitrust
enforcement. Recent cases involving utility restructuring illustrate
the problem of the low threshold many lower courts currently
embrace. Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulationwhich gives birth to the norms of competition-private firms face
strong incentives to use the regulatory process to enact partial
regulatory schemes for purposes of establishing immunity from the
antitrust laws. As states have begun to deregulate industries such
as telecommunications and electric power, the nature of state
regulation has changed. Rather than regulating utilities through
proceedings,
certificate-of-necessity
and
traditional
rate
increasingly, regulators are laying down general structural rules or
approving structural rather than pricing tariffs. As one Department
of Justice lawyer recognized: "If a state opens its retail market to
competition, then the state action doctrine would not apply to
conduct that relates directly to retail competition." 15 The reality is
not always so simple, as states frequently endorse competition in
some, but not all, aspects of formerly regulated industries, such as
How involved must
electric power and telecommunications.
regulatory oversight be in order to extend state action immunity?
A bargaining framework to lawmaking in this context is
consistent with the overall goal of protecting markets in both the
internal and external contexts. But it advises a different emphasis
for state action immunity than do previous efforts, such as Gifford's,
to read dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and state action
immunity in ways consistent with free market principles.'5 7
Understanding state and local legislation as based in bargains
focuses on the negotiation process that leads to lawmaking rather
Between states,
than on unregulated markets themselves.
bargaining frequently fails and may be costly to achieve, given the
Compact Clause. Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes,
private interest groups frequently face incentives to lobby
lawmakers to secure benefits and may prefer open-ended regulatory
schemes, which leave details to be worked out by an agency on a
firm-by-firm basis. The more local the lawmaking process, the less
costly it is for such interest groups to organize and influence the
process. At the local level, this capture may be more visible, but it
also may be more stable, given the ability to capture the political as
156. Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., State Action Doctrine Losing Relevance,
Department of Justice Attorney Says, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1999, at 70
(quoting Milton A. Marquis, attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division).
157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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well as the regulatory process. Thus, if courts were to focus on the
quality of the political process leading to enactment of a market
restraint, the municipal-state distinction would make sense-it
would require courts to apply more scrutiny to local, as opposed to
state, regulations in restraint of trade. Instead of simply being seen
as protecting markets per se, state action immunity, like the
dormant commerce clause, can be understood as reinforcing
representation. The main difference is that, in the Sherman Act
context, Congress has already declared that the overriding purpose
is to promote competition, so the primary source of the competitive
norm is legislation, not cooperation between the states.
This understanding also has implications for the approach
courts should take in applying state action immunity to lawmaking
at the state level. As Frank Easterbook has suggested, legal
presumptions can play an important role in antitrust law,
particularly where they serve as filters for judicial consideration of
antitrust claims.' 58 If approached as a type of default rule for
guiding judicial intervention, such presumptions can set incentives
in the bargaining process of state law making.
First, as to the clear purpose requirement, some have argued
that courts should interpret this as a type of clear statement rule
designed to promote more democratic decision making at the state
level. State action immunity, implied from the Sherman Act, affords
immunity for the purpose of promoting federalism. Thus, it is
valued because of the democratic legitimacy it affords, not because
state decisions in and of themselves are sacrosanct. Clear statement
rules skew decision making towards the political process. 59 If the
state legislature adopts a clear statement, or expressly articulates
policy to regulate in restraint of trade, courts will decline to
interfere under the first prong of the Midcal test. Otherwise the
legislature will play an important role in deciding whether courts
review the action. As William Page has argued in some of the
leading articles on state action immunity, such a clear statement
heightens the visibility of legislation by encouraging participants in
the political process to acquire information about and debate
Absent such a statement, private conduct that is
policies. 6
158. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9
(1984).
159. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597
(1992).
160. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process:A
Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal
Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1123-24 (1981); William H. Page, Interest
Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

consistent with or authorized by broad delegations to municipal
governments or regulatory agencies would be subject to review
under the Sherman Act.
Dillon's rule, a canon that only broadly applied in state courts to
invalidate broad state delegations to municipalities (most states
have moved away from this with the growth of "home rule"), may
serve the same overall goal of providing a higher level of supervision
for municipal lawmaking. 16' The effect of the clear articulation
requirement, however, is not to create a federally enforced version of
Dillon's rule. Dillon's rule invalidates delegations to municipalities
absent express consideration by the state legislature. 162 In contrast
to Dillon's rule, which automatically invalidates the delegation, the
clear articulation requirement subjects the delegation to scrutiny
under the Sherman Act, but still allows it to stand if it does not
unlawfully restrain trade or is not otherwise anticompetitive.
Yet, traditional clear statement rules are limited by the fact
that they assume that a legislature itself speaks with a single
purpose and voice. As Kenneth Shepsle and many others before and
after him have put it, a legislature is a "they," not an "it."'63 A clear
statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get at legislative intent-to
pay fidelity to past preferences, which are judicially constructed as a
fiction-but a legislature will rarely have a clear intent on an issue
of complex economic regulation. Courts may abuse clear statement
rules by using them as backdoor ways to impose a constitutional
design, allowing "judicial modesty [to cloak] judicial activism. " "
Moreover, a clear statement rule assumes that the major problem is
the legislature, not the interest groups that interact with it. In
contrast, a different type of interpretive canon-a default rulecould be a better way of conceptualizing the clear articulation
requirement. Einer Elhauge has recently argued for a "penalty
default rule" in judicial interpretation of statutes: Where a court
interpreting a statute is unsure of Congress's intent, the court
adopts the interpretation of the statute that is most unfavorable to
the interest group which is most capable of persuading Congress to
reverse the interpretation. 16 Much like penalty default rules in
Theory ofLegislation, 1987 DuKE L.J. 618, 619.
161. Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHL-KENT L. REV. 959, 96061 (1991).
162. See Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).
163. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It". Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
164. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 159, at 646.
165. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2169 (2002).
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contract law, 66 such an approach would encourage a different type of
Specifically, Elhauge
private behavior in future transactions.
envisions such an approach as influencing private behavior to
procure more explicit legislative action in the future, which could
increase the accountability of the political process. The clear
articulation requirement might serve a similar purpose. Understood
as a penalty-enhancing default rule, a clear articulation
requirement does not give rise to automatic state action immunity.
Instead, a clear statement rule relegates ambiguity to a purpose
that the interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation
(that is, those with monopoly power in an industry) would disfavorantitrust enforcement.
A preference-eliciting default rule is only a partial solution to
the problems created by regulatory incompleteness in state
lawmaking. A clear articulation of purpose is necessary and does a
lot of the heavy lifting in state action immunity analysis, but it is
not a sufficient basis for suspending judicial review of market
conduct under the Sherman Act. For example, Oregon has clearly
expressed a legislative policy to remove market competition by
authorizing regulators to approve allocations of service territories. 67
What matters in judicial gatekeeping in the consideration of
antitrust claims is not just the legislature's clarity in delegating to
the regulator but also what the regulator does in exercising its
discretion. Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit properly refused to
extend state action immunity to a utility's purported
anticompetitive conduct in dividing Portland into exclusive service
territories, given that regulators had not made firm-specific
decisions to displace competition with regulation.'68 Although the
utility claimed that its conduct was consistent with previous
contracts and orders agreed to under generally delegated
ratemaking authority, the only way the regulator could have
mandated service territories was pursuant to a statute under which
the regulator had not acted. 69 According to the Ninth Circuit, "mere
'state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in
' 70
restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity."
If clear articulation alone were sufficient to provide a shield
from the Sherman Act, private interests could lobby for a delegation
166. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 757 (1992).
167. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 758.405-758.450 (2003); Columbia Steel Casting
Co. v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.3d 1427, 1433 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
168. Columbia Steel CastingCo., 111 F.3d at 1441-42.
169. See id. at 1442.
170. Id. at 1440 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716, 736 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
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under clear statutory language (however broad) and then engage in
conduct that would otherwise be impermissible under the Sherman
Act, even where the conduct completely escaped the scrutiny of
agency regulators. By encouraging firms to lobby for antitrust
exclusion in state legislation, this could have forum selection effects.
For example, a state restructuring plan that stated that a scheme of
competitive restructuring was intended to displace antitrust
enforcement could alone eviscerate the competitive norms of the
antitrust laws, regardless of how such a scheme organized the
industry and monitored firm behavior. While the Sherman Act
allows positive state regulation, it does not authorize state repeal of
federal antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even
through plain language overrides.''
Thus, to the extent the
preference-eliciting default rule interpretation of state action
immunity eviscerates the active scrutiny requirement, it concedes
too much. This result is not required by deference or notions of
federalism and may prove harmful to social welfare.
Under existing doctrine, active supervision of the conduct, as
well as a clear statement of purpose, is required in order to trigger
state action immunity from antitrust enforcement. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has not had the recent occasion to address this
issue, lower courts (particularly in the Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits) have been alarmingly deferential to regulators in applying
this second prong of the Midcal test. 172 Consistent with the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in the context of municipal regulation,
lower courts have read out of state action immunity analysis any
serious scrutiny of supervision, focusing instead on whether the
legislature has delegated authority to supervise to an agency. In
most cases, potential supervision of conduct alone has been
sufficient to trigger state action immunity from enforcement of the
antitrust laws.
However, judicial deference to regulatory power, or potential
regulation, without more, invites interest group manipulation of the
regulatory forum for enforcement of competitive norms.
For
example, in the context of electric power restructuring debates at
the state level, firms seeking immunity from the antitrust laws
might lobby for delegation of decisions regarding competitive access
to essential facilities, as well as pricing, to the regulator. Delegation
of this authority, however, does not mean that the regulator has
exercised it in ways that are consistent with the pro-competitive
171. See William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the
Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.
189, 191-93 (1993).
172. See supranotes 134-46 and accompanying text.
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goals of the Sherman Act. Allowing state action immunity to
preclude antitrust enforcement in such circumstances creates strong
incentives for delegation to state regulators with little or no
guarantee that such authority is exercised in ways that promote
federalism or social welfare, let alone competition.
Courts thus need to depart from their current and past practice
of diluting the active supervision requirement. Again, a preferenceeliciting approach would be useful. 173 Rather than implying active
supervision from the historical fact of delegation, a general
presumption against active supervision would force litigants to
present evidence of a pattern of regulatory activity and would elicit
more explicit future lobbying of regulators by monopolies. Put
simply, an opportunity for regulation is not the same as active
supervision-although courts seem to consistently reach this
conclusion. The opportunity for regulation is the first step of the
active supervision analysis, but it hardly concludes it. A preferenceeliciting default rule approach would also have courts assess how
frequently, and under what circumstances, supervisory authority is
exercised.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized as much in allowing an
electric cooperative to sue a utility for refusing access to essential
transmission facilities. Although the utility claimed that the state
regulatory scheme clearly envisioned the utility refusing to wheelto the extent the state had adopted a clear policy to displace
competition among electric suppliers-the Ninth Circuit did not
allow this to trigger immunity from antitrust liability. 174 Under
Idaho state law, the utility could decline the customer's wheeling
request without the substantive review of a state agency or state
courts, but the court reasoned that "[t]his is the type of private
regulatory power that the active supervision prong of Midcal is
designed to prevent. 17 5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, a selfpolicing regulatory scheme may not require active supervision to
qualify for state action immunity,'7 6 but where the regulator has
discretion to exercise active supervision it is an appropriate inquiry
for a court. Similarly, departing from its previously deferential
approach, the Tenth Circuit refused to extend state action immunity
to lock-up contracts between Southwestern Bell that were "neither
mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about" by

173. Elhauge, supra note 165, at 2284.
174. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1189, 1190-91
(9th Cir. 2001).
175. Id. at 1194.
176. Id. (citing Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1987); FTC v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992)).
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state regulators.
Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active supervision
threshold can create, some lower courts recognize that active
supervision "would be satisfied if the state or state agencies held
ratemaking hearings on a consistent basis."78 Such an inference is a
good starting point for analysis of the application of antitrust laws
in a deregulated environment and might be a good starting place for
a presumption of state action immunity. In Ticor, for instance, the
Supreme Court found it relevant that the Wisconsin state regulatory
body had not held rate hearings prior to approving a jointly filed
insurance rate. 7 9 Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this
standard. For example, a contract provision prohibiting a customer
from entering into the electricity market as a competitor in the
future, offered by a utility in exchange for a discounted rate, is not
protected by state action immunity.' 80 Without meaningful agency
review of the specific private conduct at issue, state action immunity
can be abused in a deregulatory environment.
In interpreting the active supervision requirement, courts must
be true to the overall federalism purposes of state action immunity.
Fidelity to federalism would not limit assessment of supervision to
states only, but would also include other regulatory bodies, such as
municipalities. In addition, fidelity to federalism would require that
some attention be given to the process which gives rise to regulatory
supervision. If the purposes of regulatory action overlap with the
overall consumer welfare goals of the Sherman Act, deference to
supervision by the state or local actor is appropriate. However, if
the purpose is blatantly protectionist in ways that do not even
arguably improve consumer welfare and that impose spillover costs
on those in other jurisdictions who have not participated in the
process leading to the adoption of regulation, intervention of the
antitrust laws may be appropriate. A penalty-enhancing default
rule would align private incentives to ensure more explicit
procurement of state action immunity via legislation and regulatory
activity.
While the Ninth Circuit should be applauded for recognizing the
role of the importance of active supervision, a later case addressing
state antitrust immunity in the very same antitrust claim
177. Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d
1124, 1140 (10th Cir. 2002).
178. Green v. Peoples Energy Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
73,999
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding active supervision where lengthy hearings were held on
gas supplier's rates on a consistent basis).
179. 504 U.S. at 629-31.
180. United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 176
(W.D.N.Y. 1998).
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undermines the active supervision prong by allowing it to hinge on
the nature of the regulatory program put in place by a state
legislature. Following the Ninth Circuit's recognition that there was
no state action immunity, 81 the Idaho legislature amended its
Electric Supplier Stablization Act, under which the utility had
previously declined a wheeling request absent agency review. 182 The
amendments allowed an electricity supplier to refuse to wheel power
if the requested wheeling "result[ed] in retail wheeling and/or a
sham wholesale transaction," subject to review of the state
In addition, the Idaho legislature prohibited
regulatory agency.
competing suppliers from serving customers or former customers of
other electric suppliers unless the competing supplier petitioned the
Idaho regulator and the regulator issued an order allowing the
service.114 The Ninth Circuit held that, unlike the previous statutory
arrangement which left the decision not to wheel entirely to private
choice, the amended statute "ha[d] not left unregulated a private
preserve without competition" and thus met the active supervision
The Ninth Circuit
requirement for state action immunity.'
emphasized that the Idaho statute precluded a private utility from
wheeling without a contrary order from the state regulator.8 6 The
result is that statutes and regulations that prohibit competitive
conduct can eviscerate any active supervision requirement. If a
private firm is successful in lobbying for a statute that prohibits it
from engaging in competitive conduct, it will be immune from
antitrust challenges. However, a court should not take a prohibition
on allowing access to a network facility at face value, but it should
evaluate carefully the scope of the regulator's discretion to override
the private choice, including the criteria the regulator should apply
in making such a decision.
Revival of the active supervision portion of judicial review in
state action immunity analysis does not imply that courts should
subject state and local regulation to strict scrutiny review, as
advocates of deference seem to suggest. Rather, to make the
connection explicit, the type of judicial review called for in
evaluating state action immunity is more akin to what courts
provide under the political process account of the dormant commerce
clause. State action immunity is less consequential than other

181. See supra text accompanying notes 174-76.
182. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 357 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th
Cir. 2004).
183. IDAHO CODE § 61-332D(1) (Michie 2002).
184. IDAHO CODE §§ 61-332B, -334B(1) (Michie 2002).

185. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n, 357 F.3d at 1049.
186. Id. at 1048.
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judicial review of legislation or regulation, as it does not result in
condemning public conduct or necessarily striking legislation but
instead merely subjects private conduct to review under the
antitrust laws. If the type of regulation does not present veiled
wealth transfers-benign rent seeking would not impair the political
process-private conduct that is supervised by the regulator
generally would be shielded from the scope of the Sherman Act.
Rent seeking that thwarts the representative political process,
however, would not be used by private firms as a strategy to escape
judicial review under the antitrust standards of the Sherman Act.
Such an approach preserves federalism values by protecting the
type of democratic participation that forms the core of federalism. It
also reduces the incentive for private interest groups to lobby state
and local regulators in ways that allow state action immunity to
become a strategy (much like the filed tariff doctrine) for opting out
of antitrust enforcement in ways that impose spillover costs outside
of a state.
IV.

TURNING FEDERAL PREEMPTION ON ITS HEAD: NUDGING
LAWMAKERS TO REVEAL THEIR PREFERENCES

Federal preemption is perhaps the most comprehensive way of
bolstering interstate market coordination in deregulated industries.
Congress, for example, can pass comprehensive legislation, or a
federal agency may adopt comprehensive regulations, concerning
the management of network facilities in deregulated markets.
Explicit federal preemption is one way of bolstering the goals of the
interstate market coordination goals of the dormant commerce
clause in this context. For example, some have suggested that
Congress needs to expand FERC's authority over transmission line
siting. 187
However, as in the contexts of the filed rate doctrine, the
dormant commerce clause, and state action immunity, the judicial
approach in this context contains a deference trap for those who do
not approach carefully. First, under the Chevron doctrine, which
federal courts frequently invoke in deferring to reasonable agency
interpretations of law,' 8 a federal agency's construction of its

expanded congressional
187. Professor Richard Pierce embraces
authorization for FERC to resolve transmission siting disputes. Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., EnvironmentalRegulation, Energy & Market Entry, DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. (forthcoming 2005). For more than a decade, Pierce has been
arguing for the same basic congressional solution. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity,
15 ENERGY L. J. 323, 334 (1994). But Congress has consistently failed to act.
188. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
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jurisdictional statutes is generally upheld. Because deference to a
federal agency leads to national uniformity, judicial deference in
reviewing regulations involving federalism issues implicitly adopts a
national supremacy understanding of federalism. Courts have a
general preference for a federal supremacy approach to the
resolution of jurisdictional battles and for uniformity in their legal
resolution. However, notwithstanding a deferential posture which
favors federal over state authority (since often federal and state
regulators share jurisdictional turf) a jurisdictional commons may
create problems of regulatory inaction.189 Where both state and
federal regulators possess jurisdiction, neither federal nor state
regulators may act if the political costs of regulating are high. For
example, in the context of California's failed deregulation plan,
federal regulators blamed California's retail price cap as a cause of
the failure of its competitive policies, while California regulators
blamed FERC for skyrocketing power procurement costs due to
FERC's failure to impose a price cap on whole power sales.' 90
Second, courts largely defer to federal regulatory processes,
treating states as black boxes in the formulation of regulatory
solutions.
The result of deference is to presumptively favor
imperfect federal solutions while largely ignoring states. However,
as the recent turn to focus on state and local governance
chronicles, 9' states are complex and nuanced regulatory systems
whose governance features should not be ignored.
A different public law approach would not embrace automatic
deference to federal and state regulators in this context. Where
Congress does not act-and Congress certainly is not the institution
on which the success of deregulated markets should hinge-federal
courts have the power to nudge states towards action by
empowering state siting boards to take into account federal goals in
interstate transmission markets, even absent state legislative
authorization.

837, 843-44 (1984). As the Supreme Court stated in Chevron, "[An agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's
views of wise policy to inform its judgments." Id. at 865.
189. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (noting that "a regulatory
commons creates predictable incentives for political inattention").
190. Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory
Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public

Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1785-86 (2002).
191. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of
Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Gillette, supra note 161, at
959.
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Congress's Obstacles

Proposals to expand FERC's authority over transmission siting
are not new. For more than a decade, industry experts have
recognized that such modifications to the FPA will be necessary for
competition to thrive. The most recent proposals do not vest FERC
with primary authority over siting but envision FERC as playing a
back-up role where individual states fail to reach closure on siting
Regional Transmission Organizations
disputes on their own.
("RTOs") would provide an important forum for the resolution of
these disputes, with FERC having the ultimate authority to order
expansion where states fail to do so themselves. 192 It is likely that
such proposals will continue to be made to Congress, although it is
questionable whether any will be adopted into law.
As others have suggested, FERC's authority to preempt state
siting of transmission lines needs to be modified.' 93 Unfortunately,
Congress faces some institutional obstacles of its own in
implementing reforms. In a recent defense of the "presumption
against preemption," which would empower states to take the
initiative to solve many of these issues on their own, Roderick Hills
summarizes three main failures of the federal government, and
particularly Congress, in setting legal reform agendas. 94 Each of
these is applicable to energy legislation such as that recently
proposed to expand FERC's transmission jurisdiction.
First, Hills observes that collective action problems allow
narrowly focused interest groups to control even national regulatory
processes, echoing what Richard Stewart has referred to as
"Madison's Nightmare"'95-a

faction-ridden

maze

of capture

of

national majoritarian political processes by interest groups. In the
energy legislation context, it is quite common for Congress to bundle
together multiple unregulated reforms, producing logrolling
solutions that may confront obstacles due to one or two high-profile
objectionable provisions. For example, the primary energy bill
before Congress in 2003 contained provisions that would have more
clearly expanded FERC's authority over transmission in order to
enhance reliability. 96 This bill failed to pass primarily because of

192. See Energy Policy Act of 2004, H.R. 4503, 108th Cong. § 1221.
193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. RODERICK M. HILLS, JR., AGAINST PREEMPTION: How FEDERALISM CAN
IMPROVE THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, 8-15 (John M. Olin Center for

Law & Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=412000.
195. Id. at 8-11; see also Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 335 (1990).
196. See Energy Policy Act of 2003, H.R. 6, 108th Cong. § 16012.
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unrelated statutory provisions limiting state tort liability for the
fuel oxygenate methyl tertiary butyl ether (better known as
MTBE).' 97
In addition, as Hills suggests, individual representatives are
frequently preoccupied with pleasing constituents-by approving
earmarks and pork-loaded packages-leading Congress to neglect
Again, energy legislation provides an
general policymaking. 98
example of the failures of the national political process. The 2003
energy bill contained multiple provisions on different topics aimed
at local or regional constituents, such as provisions aimed to provide
federal aid for, among others, a Shreveport, Louisiana shopping
mall which houses the chain restaurant "Hooters." 99 Senator John
McCain dubbed the proposed legislation a bill for "Hooters and
polluters."2 0
Finally, Hills observes, what Samuel Beer has called "political
overload"20 1 plagues the ability of Congress to set the regulatory
agenda, since only a small number of issues can effectively occupy
Congress's agenda.0 2 In the energy context, again, Congress is
unlikely to even consider national energy legislation unless a major
national or international crisis brings it to the agenda-the Mideast
oil embargo (leading to passage of President Carter's energy plan in
1978),2°3 the Gulf War (leading to passage of the Energy Policy Act of
1992),204 or post-September 11 concerns over the relationship
between terrorism and oil (leading to Congress's failed energy bill in
2003).205 On occasion, individual members of Congress propose
stand-alone bills designed to expand FERC's authority, but these
generally have little support in Congress and frequently disappear

197. Peter Behr & Dan Morgan, Without Energy Legislation, Grid, Power
Policy in Limbo, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2003, at El; Carl Hulse, Even with
Bush's Support, Wide-Ranging Legislation May Have Been Sunk by Excess, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at A17.
198. HILLS, supra note 194, at 11-13; see also BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE
PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE

(1987).

199. See Energy Policy Act of 2003, H.R. 6 § 1366; see also Hitchin' a Ride:
Pork Projects in the Energy Bill, PUB. CITIZEN, at http://www.citizen.org/
cmep/energy-environuclear/electricity/energybill2005/articles.cfm?ID=11084
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
200. Dan Morgan, The GOP Congress, High on the Hog, WASH. POST, Jan.
18, 2004, at BO.
201. Samuel H. Beer, PoliticalOverload & Federalism, 10 POLITY 5 (1977).
202. HILLS, supra note 194, at 13-15; see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS,
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 15-17 (2d ed. 1995).
203. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92
Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2644 (2000)).
204. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
205. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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without a hearing.0 6
Even if Congress fails to expand FERC's authority-as much of
the political science to which Roderick Hills cites would predict-the
Cross-Sound line dispute2 7 illustrates that FERC may increasingly
play a role in related regulatory proceedings over which it has
jurisdiction and can play a positive role in the process. The CrossSound dispute illustrates that FERC has some power, albeit limited,
to act on its own without congressional authorization under new
statute enactment. For example, in the Cross-Sound dispute, FERC
threatened to make a decision in a related proceeding, involving
updating of an older transmission line. This threat of regulatory
action brought state regulators to the negotiation table. This move
demonstrated that FERC's cognate authority over related projects is
a powerful tool to bring parties to the bargaining table. Although
not every environmental concern was placated by the resulting
settlement, LIPA, Cross-Sound, and CP&L each agreed to contribute
$2 million to a fund, to be administered jointly by New York and
Connecticut, dedicated to the study and preservation of Long Island
Sound."0 8 In some instances, FERC may be able to use its clear
regulatory authority--over mergers, transmission tariffs, and
RTOs-to bring parties to the table if impasses occur, even if it is
unable to preempt state siting processes. Yet, it is well recognized
that FERC cannot solve these disputes on its own.
As counterintuitive as it might sound, absent action by
Congress and FERC, the presumption should be in favor of state
siting board regulators acting to solve the problems with interstate
transmission. If nothing else, a presumption in favor of state
jurisdiction might work to set the national lawmaking agenda, but
more importantly, it might place clear incentives on state
regulators, making action more likely in a situation where state and
federal regulators seem to have reached an impasse.
B. How FederalCourts Can Overcome RecalcitrantState
Legislatures
Many state siting statutes were adopted with old regulatory
structures (based on a nationally uniform cost-of-service structure)
206. In 2004, Senator Hillary Clinton proposed a stand-alone reliability bill,
presumably because she had concluded that the larger energy bill was doomed.
See Sen. Clinton to Push Reliability Bill, Urges Leaders to Pass It Apart from
the Energy Bill, ELECTRIC UT. WK., Jan. 19, 2004, at 3. However, with an
election year in 2004, many considered a more streamlined bill unlikely to pass
Congress unless it was very modest.
207. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
208. Bruce Lambert, New York and ConnecticutAgree to End Cable Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at B6.
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in mind. In many states, siting statutes do not authorize state or
local regulators to do anything to open up their network access
facilities to out-of-state competitors. In this sense, one barrier to
interstate power markets is state legislatures, which do not have the
institutional incentive to modify old regulatory statutes. To the
extent the problem is state legislature recalcitrance (whether tacit
or explicit), federal courts might attempt to draw on preemption
principles to overcome impasses by introducing greater competition
in the state political process, reducing the ability of any one branch
or level of state or local government to be recalcitrant through
inaction.
As an illustration, consider the issue of a state legislature's
failure to authorize regulatory action by state or local agencies
under state siting statutes. State siting bodies may not be able to
act to site facilities or even to consider the interstate implications of
siting absent authorization by a state legislature. In the context of
deregulated wholesale power markets, individual states frequently
face strong incentives to defect in order to protect firms in their own
internal market, such as local utilities. Several states have adopted
moratoria on exempt wholesale generators or have limited
regulators' authority to site such plants to in-state utilities only.
Florida's Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted a state power
plant siting statute to limit plant siting to those suppliers who are
Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida utilities.0 9
Effectively, merchant power plants are precluded from siting in
Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market. Perhaps
taking a cue from Florida's success in blocking the development of
new wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state
customers, other state and local governments, particularly in the
southeastern United States, have imposed moratoria on merchant
plants.2 10 Pursuant to the siting statute passed by the Florida
Legislature, Duke Energy's application was rejected by the Florida
Supreme Court, even though the state agency initially had accepted
it, believing it had the legal jurisdiction to do so.
However, even where a state legislature is recalcitrant and fails
to authorize local or state-wide regulatory agencies to take into
209. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that
the state's power plant siting statute "was not intended to authorize the
determination of need for a proposed power plant output that is not fully
committed to use by Florida customers who purchase electrical power at retail
rates").
210. See Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the
Need for a New Regulatory Model, 13 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (2000); Nervous of NOx,
Southern Govs. Put Plants on Hold, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001; State
Limits on Merchant Plants a Growing Worry, GENERATION WK., Aug. 22, 2001.
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account federal goals (such as concerns with reliability in
deregulated wholesale power markets) while siting transmission
lines or power plants, courts could presumptively authorize such
officials to act to pursue federal goals. Roderick Hills has argued for
a presumption against preemption 2n-the political science reasons
he gives for it have particular resonance in the context of electric
power-but in many instances (as in Florida) state officials and local
political bodies lack the authority to act. As Hills has argued
elsewhere, state regulator initiative on issues might be facilitated by
"dissecting the state"-if state and local agencies are presumptively
authorized to implement federal goals, even where state enabling
legislation is ambiguous as to state agency jurisdiction. 12 When a
federal program gives grant money directly to a state governor or
local governments, it plays the executive branch or local
governments against the state. Similarly, when Congress passes a
statute (such as the Federal Power Act), and a federal agency clearly
articulates general goals for implementing the statute (as FERC has
articulated the goal of deregulated interstate wholesale power
markets), even if Congress has not delegated specific
implementation authority to the agency, it might be implied that it
has given remedial implementation authority to state agencies,
overriding state constitutional doctrines such as separation of
powers. Presumptive preemption of structural constraints in state
constitutions serves the function of allowing states to work towards
correcting congressional failures that may remain in statutes.
Instead of deferring to state court interpretation of limited
authority for siting boards, an alternative approach to reviewing the
agency's jurisdiction would have ignored the ambiguous
jurisdictional limits in the state statute, presumptively authorizing
the state officials to consider the application of-and to site-the
facility if this were related to the pursuit of clear (albeit general)
federal goals in reliable deregulated wholesale power markets. This
presumption would be overcome only if the state legislature were
explicit in its recalcitrance, adopting a statute that would preclude
consideration of the issue by state regulators.
By simultaneously embracing a presumption against federal
preemption in interpretation of statutes and regulations and a
presumption in favor of state or local regulatory action (that is,
authorizing state and local officials to act notwithstanding a tacitly
recalcitrant legislature), public law could align incentives to favor
211. See HILLS, supra note 194, at 2.
212. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissectingthe State: The Use of FederalLaw to
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures'Control, 97 MICH. L. REV.
1201, 1232 (1999).
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national reform of statutes or regulations in the context of economic
regulation. In contrast to the current approach, a presumption
against preemption would leave responsibility clearly in the hands
of state actors. State and local officials would presumptively be
authorized to act to pursue federal goals, although if a state
legislature wished to override the authority of a state agency to
implement a federal program it would possess the authority to do so
expressly. So understood, a judicially imposed set of default rules
could promote coordinated federalism, even where Congress has not
acted. Judicially led coordinated federalism would replace courtmediated competition between the federal government and the
states-which often leads to regulatory impasse-with cooperation.
Simultaneously, federal courts may stimulate regulatory action to
address interstate network problems in states where none currently
exist by introducing competition within the branches of state
government. There are two primary objections to such a set of
default rules. The first is that federal courts lack the power to
implement them and that they are internally inconsistent. The
second is that this approach glorifies states' rights or idealizes states
as innovators.
To address the second objection first, this is not a states' rights
view of economic regulation. Indeed, there is no such thing, given
that Congress has broad power to override states on most, if not all,
issues of economic regulation. Even this, though, does not make
states black boxes in discussion of the allocation of jurisdictional
authority. States have an important role to play. The point is not,
however, that states are inherently superior to the national
government as innovators. Nor is it to promote decentralization as
an end state of affairs. Instead, it is that states would act as
facilitators and agenda-setters in national lawmaking, helping
national solutions to adapt to regulatory problems where the
national lawmaking process fails to on its own. Judicially led
coordinated federalism is a second-best solution to congressional
reforms of national regulatory statutes that fail to give federal
agency regulators the necessary jurisdiction, but it also may prove
necessary to overcome existing obstacles to regulatory reform in
network industries.
The first objection-that federal courts lack the power to apply
these default rules, and that they are internally inconsistent-also
does not withstand scrutiny. These proposals are not premised on
any constitutional power on which the conventional set of default
rules in public law does not also rely. The power to vest state and
local officials with authority to implement federal goals, like the
conventionally accepted judicial power to create implied preemption,
can be derived from the Commerce Clause. Where Congress or
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federal regulators, within their constitutional authority, have stated
a general goal, courts presumably would look to state or local
regulators to implement it. This is not coercive, as state political
actors still would have to make the choice to regulate. If the state
political process, such as legislation, explicitly overrides this choice,
state action is more likely to exist for purposes of mounting a
dormant commerce clause challenge if the state approach imposes
spillover costs on interstate commerce. This approach downplays
the significance of "independent" state constitutions, but many
states already recognize in their constitutional jurisprudence that
state constitutions are not to be interpreted in isolation where a
state is implementing a federal program.21
As a matter of
constitutional law, federal courts have as much power to implement
such a set of default rules as they do to read implied preemption of
state law into federal statutes and regulations. In fact, to the extent
the presumptive authorization of state executive or local agency
regulation to implement federal goals is based on political process
considerations, rather than a substantive legal mandate that
altogether precludes state regulation, it should be less controversial
than implied preemption of substantive law, under which a federal
court forces a state to make a substantive policy choice that is
consistent with federal law even where Congress has not clearly
spoken. Rather than reading judicial power broadly by expansive
jurisdictional readings of federal statutes and regulations-as
traditional jurisdictional federalism would envision-the default
rules for preemption envision a more modest role for the courts, as
they align political incentives to favor cooperative federalism
approaches even where Congress has not explicitly done so. While a
presumption against preemption of substantive statutes and
regulations may seem at odds with a presumption that preempts
state constitution allocations of powers, these default rules are no
less inconsistent than the conventional public law approach, which
favors preemption of substantive law but disfavors preemption of
state constitutions.
Such an approach gives state and local governments a more
213. See, e.g., Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 265-66 (Fla.
1976); McFaddin v. Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Tenn. 1987); Ex parte Elliott,
973 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Tex. App. 1998). Thus, even where federal courts do
not exercise such authority, state courts might authorize such action as the best
interpretation of state constitutional separation of powers doctrine. As I have
argued elsewhere, implicit authorization for state executive and local agencies
to act on behalf of federal goals is the best interpretation of state separation of
powers-a matter of state constitutional law. Jim Rossi, Separationof Powers
and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and
Standards,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2005).
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positive role to play in deregulated markets than judicial federalism
currently envisions under public law. It creates a political process
that is more likely to clarify jurisdictional responsibility while also
lowering the costs of using state government to implement federal
goals. In the long run, it might also promote a more stable national
solution to important issues than the conventional approach of
relying on courts to draw the lines between incomplete federal
regulation and the states.
For example, in the context of electricity transmission siting, if
state and local regulatory commissions are granted presumptive
authority to consider national goals in reliable wholesale power
markets, states would clearly share responsibility with Congress for
transmission expansion. At least some state regulators in each
state would clearly possess the regulatory power to expand
transmission to accommodate deregulated markets. States might
also be implicitly authorized to build pricing for such transmission
expansion into their own regulatory structures for retail rates. This
would not solve every problem with regulation of electric power
transmission; for that, a national solution is necessary. Some states
may choose to expand transmission, allowing deregulated markets
to work, while others may not, creating chokehold regions that could
force consideration of a more national solution to state-based
transmission regulation. At the same time, responsibility for the lag
clearly would sit with the states or with Congress. If states were
presumptively authorized to take such goals into account,
presumably a state's failure to act to site transmission in response
to requests for transmission expansion could be brought within the
realm of the dormant commerce clause, ultimately facilitating the
emergence of more cooperative solutions between states where
national regulators fail to take action. At a minimum, recalcitrant
state legislatures would be required to explicitly reject state
participation in national markets. Designing default rules for
judicial review with these bargaining problems in mind will not
bring an end to all jurisdictional conflicts and impasses. Such
design can, however, make explicit previously hidden institutional
preferences within states for recalcitrance with national competition
policies, better facilitating disruption of the jurisdictional impasses
that plague the current approach to federal preemption.
V. CONCLUSION
For most of the twentieth century, the doctrines of public law
have, at their core, largely advised deference to regulators and other
political bodies. Deference may have suited the cost-of-service
ratemaking paradigm, in which regulatory jurisdiction was settled
and most utilities did not compete well in interstate markets.
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Previous authors, such as Garland, Sunstein, and Pierce, have
debated the strength of deference in such a context.2 14
However, the regulatory context has changed. As the vignettes
in this Article illustrate, in deregulated industries and other
competitive industries in transition, deference can lead to adverse
private conduct as well as to undemocratic law making. The filed
rate doctrine illustrates how deference can lead to strategic
manipulation of regulatory enforcement. As the dormant commerce
clause and state action immunity doctrine illustrate, deference can
lead to private manipulation of the lawmaking process in ways that
do not encourage the development of interstate and intrastate
markets. And federal preemption, which implicitly embraces a type
of deference to federal agencies and encourages federal courts to
ignore state political processes, may create regulatory commons in
which jurisdictional problems fester.
Lifting public law out of the deference trap would require courts
to be more mindful of incentives in the lawmaking process and their
adverse effects on social welfare-especially in a partially
deregulated industry. Deference will have an important place in
evaluating many regulatory disputes.
Courts should not, for
example, impose their own policy and market preferences on
regulators. However, rather than embracing blanket deference in
reviewing every complex regulatory law dispute, public law should
take into account ex ante incentives of private parties in the
lawmaking process as well as the behavior of law makers
themselves.
Judicial deference may be appropriate in some
contexts, such as in direct review of clearly jurisdictional agency
regulations, but in the political decision-making contexts discussed
in this Article, courts could improve the functioning of deregulated
markets by taking into account ex ante incentives for strategic
private behavior as well as the incentives associated with the
lawmaking process. Finally, if the analysis of this Article is correct,
courts will increasingly share some of the blame with Congress,
states, and regulatory agencies for dysfunctional deregulation of
industries such as electric power. Overbroad deference to regulators
and states does not excuse courts from taking responsibility for such
dysfunction.

214. See supra notes 8 and 9.

